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There are also those who think, that an act of cruelty committed, for
example, at Constantinople, may be punished at Paris; for this abstracted
reason, that he who offends humanity, should have enemies in all mankind,
and be the object of universal execration; as if judges were to be the
knights errant of human nature in general, rather than guardians of
particular conventions between men.'
I. Introduction
Universal jurisdiction is the ability of national courts to try defendants for
international crimes committed outside the state's regular jurisdiction, to
convict defendants who may have had no connection with the prosecuting state
prior to trial, and to bring accountability and justice to comers of the world
where they are sorely lacking. 2  At least in theory, anyway-in practice,
1. CESARE BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 84 (Adolph Caso ed.,
Branden 4th ed. 1992) (1775).
2. See Kenneth Roth, The Case for Universal Jurisdiction, 80 FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec.
2001, at 150, 150 ("With growing frequency, national courts operating under the doctrine of
universal jurisdiction are prosecuting despots in their custody for atrocities committed abroad.
Impunity may still be the norm in many domestic courts, but international justice is an
increasingly viable option ... ."). For the purposes of this Note, universal jurisdiction means
the exercise of jurisdiction by a national court over a criminal defendant charged with serious
violations of international law, when territoriality, physical presence, passive personality, or the
protective principle fail to provide a basis forjurisdiction. "Unlimited universal jurisdiction" or
"unlimited jurisdiction" shall be defined as universal jurisdiction exercised in the complete
absence of any connecting links between the prosecuting state and the defendant. Cf
PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION Principle I(1) (2001) ("[U]niversal
jurisdiction is criminal jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the crime, without regard to
where the crime was committed, the nationality of the alleged or convicted perpetrator, the
nationality of the victim, or any other connection to the state exercising such jurisdiction."). A
"connecting link" or "nexus" refers to some connection, normally insufficient to meet a
traditional basis for jurisdiction, between the defendant and the prosecuting state. For a
discussion and more articulate definition of universal jurisdiction with connecting links, see
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universal jurisdiction has been less potent and more problematic. 3 Recently,
two important developments in universal jurisdiction have occurred: Rose
Kabuye, Rwanda's Director of State Protocol, was arrested in Germany for
extradition to France in order to stand trial for her putative role in causing
genocide against her own ethnic minority,4 and Charles Taylor, Jr., was
convicted in the United States under the Extraterritorial Torture Statute5 for
committing torture in Liberia.6 These two cases highlight the hit or miss nature
of universal jurisdiction: Sometimes universal jurisdiction is exercised against
the worst violators of human rights,7 and sometimes it targets people of dubious
guilt.8 Prosecutions under universal jurisdiction occasionally achieve success,9
but more often than not they end in failure.10 This Note argues that a key factor
in the success of universal jurisdiction is the presence of some connecting link
infra Part IV.B. 1.
3. See, e.g., infra Parts II.D.1-2 (describing the failure of universal jurisdiction
prosecutions in Belgium and Spain to produce judgments against the defendants).
4. See Senior Rwandan Official Arrested, BBC NEWS, Nov. 10, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7718879.stm (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) (discussing the
charges against Kabuye, which allege that Tutsi rebels assassinated Rwandan President
Habyarimana in order to seize power) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
Insofar as the French prosecution blames the victims for the genocide, it is controversial; the
more accepted theory is that Habyarimana was killed by Hutu extremists, who used his death as
a pretext to instigate the genocide leading to the slaughter of 800,000 Tutsis. Id.
5. See Extraterritorial Torture Statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (2006) (defining
torture and granting criminal jurisdiction over alleged torturers who are U.S. nationals or are
present in the United States, regardless of the nationality of the victim or defendant).
6. See Son of Ex-Liberian Leader Sentenced to 97 Years in Prison, CNN NEWS, Jan. 9,
2009, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/01/09/taylor.torture.sentencing/index.html (last
visited Sept. 29, 2009) (reporting on the conviction of Charles Taylor Jr. and an upcoming class
action civil suit against him by his victims) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
While jurisdiction over the defendant came from his American citizenship, and not some theory
of universal jurisdiction, the case still remains important as the first conviction under the
Extraterritorial Torture Statute and a seminal judicial discussion of the constitutionality of
universal jurisdiction. See Julian Ku, U.S. Court Convicts "Chucky" Taylor of Torture, OPINIo
JuRis, Nov. 2, 2008, http://opiniojuris.org/2008/l1/02/us-court-convicts-chucky-taylor-of-
torture (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) (discussing the legal aspects of jurisdiction in the Taylor
trial) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
7. See infra Parts II.C. 1-2 (discussing Spanish and Belgian indictments of war criminals,
torturers, and tyrants).
8. See, e.g., supra note 4 and accompanying text (noting the indictment of Rose
Kabuye); infra note 116 and accompanying text (noting the indictments of George H. W. Bush
and Colin Powell).
9. See, e.g., infra notes 109-12 and accompanying text (discussing a successful
prosecution of Belgian gdnocidaires based on a theory of universal jurisdiction).
10. See infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing the impotence of unlimited universal jurisdiction).
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between the prosecuting state and the defendant." When universal jurisdiction
is exercised in the absence of any connecting links, it tends to be abusive,
intrusive, and ultimately fruitless.'
2
Few international legal issues are as powerful or contentious as universal
jurisdiction. Supporters of universal jurisdiction laud its potential to bring
heinous criminals to justice and end impunity for atrocity,' 3 while critics decry
the imposition of one state's judiciary into the sovereignty of another state as
"the tyranny of judges.0 4 At the crux of this debate is the very real power of
universal jurisdiction to reach across borders and influence the society and laws
of other nations. 15 But should the decidedly noble cause of achieving justice
permit one state to perform the legal and moral obligations of another state,
even when the other state objects? These conflicting principles of sovereignty
and accountability implicated by universal jurisdiction are core values of the
international legal system. 16 This Note will argue that connecting links to the
forum state are the best way to reconcile accountability with sovereignty and
ensure the responsible and meaningful exercise of universal jurisdiction.
Granted, imposing a connecting links requirement-or any other concrete
limitation--on universal jurisdiction will result in situations where an
undeniably guilty defendant escapes prosecution.'8 In that case, civil
11. For analysis of what constitutes a connecting link, see infra Part IV.B. 1. The most
salient connecting link for a prosecution would be the physical presence of a defendant in the
territory of the prosecuting state, though other connecting links also exist.
12. See infra Part IV.A (critiquing universal jurisdiction exercised without connecting
links).
13. See Roth, supra note 2, passim (advocating for universal jurisdiction).
14. HENRY KISSINGER, DOES AMERICA NEED A FOREIGN POLICY? 273 (2001).
15. Compare Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Making the State Do Justice: Transnational
Prosecutions and International Support for Criminal Investigations in Post-Armed Conflict
Guatemala, 9 CM. J. INT'L L. 79, 106 (2008) ("[T]ransnational prosecutions... can play
complementary roles in catalyzing changes in domestic ability and will to investigate and
prosecute the powerful. [Success] should be measured not only (or even principally) by how
many convictions they secure, but at how well they succeed in changing the possibilities for
justice at home."), with KISSINGER, supra note 14, at 275-76 ("The world should think carefully
about the implications of a procedure by which a single judge is able, essentially at his personal
discretion, to assert jurisdiction... and to demand extradition ... without regard to the
conciliation procedures that might exist in the country of the accused .... ").
16. See U.N. Charter pmbl. (stating the members' determination "to establish conditions
under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of
international law can be maintained"); id. art. 2, para. 4 ("The [United Nations] is based on the
principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.").
17. But cf PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION Principle 1(5) (2001)
(imposing a good faith requirement for the exercise of universal jurisdiction).
18. See Stephanie Nolan, Can Ottawa Act Against Mugabe?, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM,
Nov. 5, 2004, http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/universal/2004/1105mugabe.htm (last
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jurisdiction should supplement universal criminal jurisdiction with connecting
links, creating a judicial forum in which victims can seek relief even when no
connecting links for criminal prosecutions exist. This Note will argue that such
a combination of civil and criminal jurisdictions moderates the excesses of
unlimited universal jurisdiction while providing equal accountability and
justice.
This Note analyzes the theory and practice of universal jurisdiction, both
with and without connecting links and for criminal and civil trials. Part H
examines universal criminal jurisdiction, briefly outlining the historical
development of the theory and discussing some of the more colorable
contemporary exercises of universal jurisdiction in national courts. Part HI
explores the use of civil jurisdiction to redress violations of international law.
Finally, Part IV reviews the drawbacks of an unlimited universal jurisdiction
regime and contends that a combination of universal criminal jurisdiction with
connecting links and expansive civil jurisdiction is a superior alternative.
11. Universal Criminal Jurisdiction
Part II of this Note will address the developing practice of universal
jurisdiction in international criminal law. Part II.A will discuss the customary
bases of jurisdiction that states use to justify the exercise of their jurisdiction,
while Part II.B will briefly outline the historical development of universal
jurisdiction in international law, with a focus on the requirement of connecting
links. In Part II.C this Note will examine universal jurisdiction in practice,
surveying its exercise by different countries in order to highlight the varying
degrees to which universal jurisdiction is used today.
A. Bases of Jurisdiction
In the abstract, jurisdiction is the power of a state "to exercise authority
over all persons and things within its territory."'19 Traditionally, jurisdiction has
been based on principles of territoriality, nationality or residence, passive
visited Sept. 29, 2009) (discussing the unsuccessful attempt by human rights advocates to find
some connecting link between Canada and Robert Mugabe's abuses in Zimbabwe in order to be
able to indict Mugabe for crimes against humanity under Canadian law) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). But even if the connecting links requirement did not exist
and a prosecution against Mugabe could be made under Canadian law, it seems unlikely that
such a prosecution would actually accomplish anything.
19. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 867 (8th ed. 2004).
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personality, or protection of state interests.20 Territorial jurisdiction is the
fundamental jurisdiction exercised by states over crimes committed in whole or
in part within their own territory.21 The effects doctrine also allows states to
exercise territorial jurisdiction over crimes committed outside of a state's
territory but producing harmful effects within its territory.2 2
Bases for extraterritorial jurisdiction over crimes committed outside of the
prosecuting state traditionally have some connecting link or nexus to the
23prosecuting state. Nationality (or active personality) jurisdiction may be
asserted by states whose nationals are suspected of committing a crime,
regardless of where the crime itself was committed.24 States whose nationals
are victims of extraterritorial crimes may assert passive personality
jurisdiction,25 and the protective principle allows states to exercise jurisdiction
against all crimes that threaten their national security or vital interests.26
Jurisdiction based upon territoriality or nationality is the most accepted basis
for asserting jurisdiction, while other extraterritorial forms of jurisdiction are
newer developments.27
Universal jurisdiction is the newest and least accepted jurisdictional
basis. 28 The simplest definition of universal jurisdiction is the exercise of
jurisdiction by a state over a defendant when none of the traditional bases for
jurisdiction are fulfilled.29 Academic terminology varies widely, but at the far
20. MITSUE INAZUMI, UNWERSAL JURISDICTION IN MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
ExPANSIoN OF NATIONAL JURISDICTION FOR PROSECUTING SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 21-25 (2005).
21. Id. at 22; see also SS Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)No. 10, at20 (Sept. 7)
("[I]n all systems of law the principle of the territorial character of criminal law is
fundamental ....").
22. INAzuMI, supra note 20, at 22.
23. See id. at 23 ("States exercise their jurisdiction based on some nexus (linkage) to the
crime concerned, and diverse bases of jurisdiction based on different nexuses were
acknowledged under international law.").
24. Id. at 24.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 25.
27. See id. at 31 ("Apart from the recognition of territorial jurisdiction as the most basic
principle, the scope and extent of the acceptance of other forms of jurisdiction among States
were unclear under classic international law.")
28. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The History of Universal Jurisdiction and Its Place in
International Law, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 39, 40 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004) ("[W]hile
universal jurisdiction is attaining an important place in international law, it is not as well
established in conventional and customary international law as its ardent proponents, including
major human rights organizations, profess it to be.").
29. See INAZUm1, supra note 20, at 25 ("[U]niversal jurisdiction is exercised by States
having no relation to territorial or nationality aspects."). For Inazuni's extensive analysis of
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end of the spectrum lies a concept of all-encompassing, truly unlimited
universal jurisdiction.30 Unlimited universal jurisdiction is usually justified by
the existence of international values and interests, and a corresponding
international need to prosecute and deter violations of those values, even at the
expense of the sovereignty of other states. 31 With such ajustification, "there is
no need for a link or nexus between the enforcing power, be it national or
international, and the conduct in question, or the perpetrator or victim's
nationality. Universal jurisdiction is... based solely on the nature of the
crime." 32 But such an assertion is not entirely true: The requirement of
connecting links has long been used in the discussion of universal
jurisdiction,33 and perhaps mandating such a nexus is superior to the bold
infringements of state sovereignty which unlimited universal jurisdiction
encourages.34
Regardless of variety, the exercise of universal jurisdiction is usually
reserved for only the most severe violations of international law.35 Piracy,
slavery, and banditry were the earliest crimes for which universal jurisdiction
was allowed.36  With its transnational element,37 hijacking can easily be
differing degrees of universal jurisdiction, see generally id. at 26-30.
30. See id. at 27 (distinguishing between ordinary universal jurisdiction and universal
jurisdiction in absentia). This Note uses the term unlimited universal jurisdiction rather than
universal jurisdiction in absentia because some formulations of universal jurisdiction prohibit
trials in absentia but still permit investigation, indictment, and requests for extradition of absent
defendants. See, e.g., PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION Principle 1(2) (2001)
(prohibiting trials in absentia); id. Principle 1(3) (permitting states to request extradition on the
basis of universal jurisdiction).
31. See Bassiouni, supra note 28, at 42 (describing the normative and pragmatic
universalist positions).
32. Id. at 42-43.
33. See CrimC (Jer) 40/61 Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann (Eichmann 1), 36 I.L.R.
18, 51-52 (1961) (discussing the theories of several jurists, including Hugo Grotius, with regard
to the requirement of connecting links); see also infra Part II.C (outlining reliance upon
connecting links for universal jurisdiction in international law).
34. See infra Part II.C (tracing the development of universal jurisdiction, both with and
without connecting links, in international law); infra Part 1V.B. 1 (making the argument for
connecting links).
35. See Mary Robinson, Preface to UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 28, at 15, 16
("[U]niversal jurisdiction is based on the notion that certain crimes are so harmful to
international interests that states are entitled-and even obliged-to bring proceedings against
the perpetrator .. ").
36. Bassiouni, supra note 28, at 47, 49.
37. See LUC REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 64 n.1 15 (2001) ("The offence of aircraft
hijacking... is likely to show one or more international elements, e.g. international flight,
international airspace, diversity of nationality between the hijackers and the crew, the
passengers, the State of registration of the craft, or the 'target State.'").
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analogized to piracy in order to justify the exercise of universal jurisdiction for
it as well. 38 Universal jurisdiction may also be valid for apartheid39 and certain
acts of terrorism.40 Major violations ofJus cogens such as genocide, war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and torture are offenses widely recognized as
grounds for universal jurisdiction.41 Aggression could also be a crime for
which universal jurisdiction exists, 42 but because aggression is undefined under
international law,43 in practice it would be difficult to charge a defendant with
this offense. Finally, the use of child soldiers might be considered such a grave
breach ofjus cogens principles as to merit the exercise of universal jurisdiction
against it.44
B. The Development of Universal Jurisdiction in International Law
Universal jurisdiction developed around the crime of piracy.45 Cicero was
the first to label pirates and bandits as enemies of all mankind,46 and the pirate,
as a "hostis humanis generis" (enemy of all mankind), was subject to the
38. See United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (asserting, inter
alia, universal jurisdiction for a defendant charged with hijacking, or "air piracy").
39. See infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of universal jurisdiction
under the Apartheid Convention.
40. See Hostage Taking Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1203(b)(1)(B) (2006) (grantingjurisdiction over
hostage taking offenses which occurred outside the United States if the offender is found in the
United States).
41. See PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION Principle 2(1) (2001)
(authorizing universal jurisdiction for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
torture).
42. See id. (authorizing universal jurisdiction for crimes against peace).
43. See generally Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, Aggression: Supreme International
Offence Still in Search of Definition, 5 S. CROSS U. L. REV. 1 (2002).
44. See, e.g., Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-340, 122 Stat.
3735 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.A. (West 2009)) (granting jurisdiction for the
recruitment or use of child soldiers for a defendant present in the United States, regardless of
nationality).
45. Bassiouni, supra note 28, at 47.
46. See MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE OFFICES 384-85 (G. P. Gould ed., Loeb Classical
Library 1928) (44 B.C.) ("[F]or a pirate is not included in the number of lawful enemies, but is
the common foe [communis hostis omnium] of all the world...."). Though popularly
confused, Cicero is apparently not the source of the more common phrase hostis humanis
generis, which comes from a paraphrase of Cicero by Lord Edward Coke. Thomas J.R. Stadnik,
Pirates-The Common Enemies of All, LExiSNExis INT'L AND FOREIGN L. Cm, Dec. 18, 2008,
http://Iaw.lexisnexis.com/practiceareas/Intemational-Foreign-Law-Blog/Treaties--Conventions/
Pirates-The-Common-Enemies-of-All (last visited Sept. 29,2009) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
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jurisdiction of all states.47 Though never as widespread, universal jurisdiction
for bandits under the same rationale of hostis humanis generis also occurred:
"[T]he towns of northern Italy had already in the Middle Ages followed the
practice of trying specific types of dangerous criminals (banniti, vagabundi,
assassini) who happened to be within their area ofjurisdiction, without regard
to the place in which the crimes in question were committed. ''48 In 1815, the
Vienna Declaration of the Congress of Vienna equated slave trafficking to
piracy, and universal jurisdiction similarly developed for that offense.49
The use of universal jurisdiction for other violations of international law
was slower to develop.50 The Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of
Genocide, for example, fails to mention universal jurisdiction.5 Article 6 of
the Convention states: "Persons charged with genocide.., shall be tried by a
competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed,
or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to
those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction. 5 2 While
Article 6 is not meant to preclude the exercise of other bases ofjurisdiction,53 it
nevertheless fails to affirmatively support any international norm of universal
47. INAZUMI, supra note 20, at 50.
48. CrimC (Jer) 40/61 Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann (Eichmann 1), 36 I.L.R. 18,
26 (1961) (citations omitted). Contemporary courts have inexplicably refrained from using this
offense as grounds for universal jurisdiction, despite the resemblance of a genocidal conspiracy
to a "gang of criminals." Id. For a detailed study of banditry and universal jurisdiction, see
Willard B. Cowles, Universality ofJurisdiction over War Crimes, 33 CAL. L. REv. 177, 181-98
(1955). Cowles influentially argued for the extension of universal jurisdiction from brigands to
war criminals, id. at 198-203, though his argument dealt only with the exercise of universal
jurisdiction by belligerent states over defendants in their custody, id. at 178.
49. Bassiouni, supra note 28, at 49.
50. See id. at 47-56 (tracing the development of universal jurisdiction for crimes under
international law).
51. Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L
L. 554, 569 (1995) (noting "the absence of a provision on universal jurisdiction in the Genocide
Convention").
52. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 6,
approved and opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide
Convention] (emphasis added).
53. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Conclusion of the Consideration of the Draft Convention
on Genocide, 717, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. 134 (Dec. 2, 1948). As the Drafting Committee stated:
The first part of Article VI contemplates the obligation of the State in whose
territory acts of Genocide have been committed. Thus, in particular, it does not
affect the right of any State to bring to trial before its own tribunals any of its
nationals for acts committed outside the State.
Id. (emphasis added).
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jurisdiction for genocide. 54 In contrast, the 1949 Geneva Conventions each
state:
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for
persons alleged to have committed... grave breaches [of the Convention],
and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own
courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of
its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High
Contracted Party concerned, Provided such High Contracting Party has
made out a primafacie case.
Though the precise extent of this obligation is debatable, 6 when read broadly
the obligation to search out and prosecute violators of the Conventions
constitutes an exercise of universal jurisdiction.57 But which variation of
universal jurisdiction do the 1949 Geneva Conventions support? "The text
speaks of handing a suspect over for trial to another High Contracting Party
concerned, which suggests that a link or interest is required. 5 8  While an
expansive reading of the duty to find and prosecute grave breaches would
vitiate any requirement of connecting links, it is unlikely that in 1949 the
contracting parties intended to impose responsibility for violations of
international law in any manner similar to the exercise of unlimited universal
jurisdiction today.59 The Genocide Convention and 1949 Geneva Conventions,
54. Supra note 51 and accompanying text.
55. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field art. 49, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31;
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked art. 50, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners at War art. 129, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War art. 146, adopted Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
56. Compare REYDAMS, supra note 37, at 55 ("[A] State can only search on its own
territory and can only bring before its courts suspects who are present there."), with Bassiouni,
supra note 28, at 51 ("It is nevertheless valid to assume that the 1949 Geneva Conventions...
provide a sufficient basis for states to apply universality ofjurisdiction to prevent and repress
the 'grave breaches' of the conventions.").
57. See REYDAMS, supra note 37, at 54 (discussing the academic debate over the meaning
of the common jurisdiction clause of the 1949 Geneva Conventions). Reydams ultimately
concludes, based upon subsequent state practice in applying the 1949 Geneva Conventions, that
the common jurisdiction clause does exemplify universal jurisdiction. Id. at 55.
58. Id. at 55 (citations omitted). The equally authoritative French version translates
"concerned" as "interessre A la poursuite," further emphasizing the importance of some
connecting link. Id. at 55 n.71. Proposals explicitly requiring that extradition requests
demonstrate some interest in the prosecution failed, however, to be incorporated into the
Conventions. Id. at 55 n.72.
59. See id. at 55 ("[O]ne would not expect States at the Geneva Diplomatic Conference to
hold a substantially different view on universal jurisdiction from that which they held just a year
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while neither explicitly rejecting the practice nor supporting any exercise of
jurisdiction in the absence of connecting links, indicate the amorphic nature of
universal jurisdiction in international law at that time.6°
Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann61 was one of the first modem
cases of universal jurisdiction. 62 Given the non-existence of Israel as a country
at the time these crimes were committed, passive personality and the protective
principle were questionable grounds for jurisdiction.63 The District Court
nevertheless found that jurisdiction existed:
The State of Israel's "right to punish" the accused derives, in our view,
from two cumulative sources: a universal source (pertaining to the whole
of mankind), which vests the right to prosecute and punish crimes of this
order in every State within the family of nations; and a specific or national
earlier during the drafting of the Genocide Convention.").
60. See id. at 56 (questioning why the Geneva Conventions provided for universal
jurisdiction when the Genocide Convention does not). Reydams offers three explanations: the
more internationalized nature of war crimes, the recent world war, and the lack of attention due
to the relative size of the Geneva Conventions. Id.
61. See CrimC (Jer) 40/61 Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann (Eichmann 1), 36 I.L.R.
18,273-76 (1961) (convicting the defendant of crimes against the Jewish people, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and membership in hostile organizations). In 1960, Adolf Eichmann, a
Nazi bureaucrat living under an assumed name in Argentina, was abducted by Israeli agents and
taken to Israel to stand trial. Id. at 57. He was charged under Israel's Nazis and Nazi
Collaborators (Punishment) Law for his role in organizing the logistics of the Holocaust. Id. at
20. The defense argued that Eichmann's abduction from Argentina violated international law,
but the District Court dismissed the counsel's objections, reasoning that the defendant could not
evade trial based upon the illegality of his arrest. Id. at 57-59. The defense also argued that
Israel lacked jurisdiction over the defendant, but that argument failed as well. Id. at 20.
Extensive findings of fact detailed the defendant's part in executing the Final Solution,
including his role in the introduction of the poison gas Zyklon B to concentration camps. Id. at
86-235. The District Court found that Eichmann was not "merely a 'small cog' in the
extermination machine" but instead was the head of those charged with carrying out the Final
Solution. Id. at 226.
62. See REYDAMS, supra note 37, at 161 ("For lack of other precedents, Attorney General
of Israel v Eichmann was for a long time at the centre of any discussion on universal
jurisdiction."). Perhaps the first modern case of universal jurisdiction was Public Prosecutor v.
Milan T, Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] May 29, 1958,29 Entscheidungen des
6sterreichischen Obersten Gerichtshofes in Strafsachen [SSt] No. 32 (Austria). REYDAMS,
supra note 37, at 98. In Milan T, Austria tried a Yugoslavian defendant for property crimes
(fraud) committed in Yugoslavia after declining extradition due to fears of political persecution.
Id.
63. For the defense counsel's arguments against these grounds for jurisdiction, see
Eichmann I,36 I.L.R. at 54. But see id. at 55-57 (applying the protective principle and passive
personality retroactively as valid bases for jurisdiction).
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source, which gives the victim nation the right to try any who assault its
existence. 4
The defense challenged Israel's exercise of jurisdiction, maintaining that
international law required a connection between the prosecuting state and the
defendant. 65 Discussing the various academic positions regarding connecting
links, the District Court concluded that, under any conception of connecting
links, sufficient connections existed between the attempted extermination of the
Jewish people in the Holocaust and the State of Israel.6 6 It is unclear whether
the District Court actually accepted the defense's argument that connecting
links were necessary, only that it found sufficient links.
6 7
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Israel fully affirmed the lower court's
finding ofjurisdiction, 6 though the articulation of the legal reasoning differed.
The Supreme Court, relying on the reasoning of the Lotus case,69 justified
Israeli jurisdiction over Eichmann on the grounds that no international norm
prohibiting such jurisdiction existed.70  Analyzing various theories of
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court found support for its absolute exercise of
universal jurisdiction over Eichmann7 1-and then endorsed the District Court's
finding of connecting links between Israel and Eichmann's Jewish victims.
72
Taken as a whole, the Eichmann opinions advance the torch of universal
jurisdiction but fail to shed light on the possibility of requiring connecting
64. Id. at 50.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 49-54.
67. Id.
68. See CrimA 336/61 Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann (Eichmann I), 36 I.L.R.
277, 279 (1962) ("The District Court has in its judgment dealt with both categories of
contentions in an exhaustive, profound and most convincing manner. We should say at once
that we fully concur, without hesitation or reserve, in all its conclusions and reasons....").
69. See SS Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19 (Sept. 7) (declaring
that under international law states may act as they want, except when a positive rule exists
prohibiting them from doing so).
70. Eichmann H1, 36 I.L.R. at 283-85. Sovereignty concerns were mitigated by the fact
that the West German government expressly declined to try the defendant in Germany. See id.
at 287 (dismissing the defense's argument against jurisdiction in part upon that basis).
71. See id. at 298-304 (discussing theories of universal jurisdiction).
72. See id. at 304 ("It should be made clear that we fully agree with every word said by
the [District] Court on [the matter of connecting links]."). The Supreme Court of Israel added:
"If in our judgment we have concentrated on the international and universal character of the
crimes of which the appellant has been convicted, one of the reasons for our so doing is that
some of them were directed against non-Jewish groups ...." Id. It sounds like the courts may
have resorted to unlimited universal jurisdiction in order to justify supplemental jurisdiction
over the non-Jewish victims. See infra Part IV.B.3 (discussing supplemental jurisdiction over
victims with no connection to the prosecuting state).
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links; Israel's clear interest in punishing Nazis justifies various jurisdictional
approaches, and resort to universality merely reinforces the courts' findings of
jurisdiction.
After the Eichmann case, international law rapidly began to codify.73 One
early indication of this trend was the International Convention on the
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.74 The parties to the
Apartheid Convention agreed to "adopt legislative, judicial and administrative
measures to prosecute, bring to trial and punish in accordance with their
jurisdiction persons responsible for" apartheid. 75 The Apartheid Convention
also established jurisdiction over defendants charged with crimes of apartheid.76
Because only the white minority regimes in Rhodesia, Namibia, and South
Africa committed apartheid, and because those countries would neverjoin the
agreement, the universal jurisdiction created under Article V would never be
used against any of the parties affirming it and could only be exercised against
nationals of non-parties.77 States were thus free to ratify the use of universal
jurisdiction in the Apartheid Convention without fearing reciprocity.78 While
the Apartheid Convention was an important landmark for universal jurisdiction,
it only stands for the proposition that states advocate universal jurisdiction most
strongly when it can only be exercised against others.79
Though later international conventions did not go as far as the Apartheid
Convention, a trend of including aut dedere aut judicare ("extradite or
73. See REYDAMS, supra note 37, at 47 ("After World War II global and regional
intergovernmental organizations became the driving forces behind an intensified treaty-making
process.").
74. See International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, adopted Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243 (defining, criminalizing, and
stigmatizing apartheid).
75. Id. art. IV, para. b.
76. See id. art. V ("Persons charged with [apartheid] maybe tried bya competent tribunal
of any State Party to the Convention which may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
accused....").
77. REYDAMS, supra note 37, at 59-60.
78. Id. The Soviet Union was especially enthusiastic about universal jurisdiction for
apartheid, despite its adamant stance against universal jurisdiction in the Genocide Convention.
Id. at 60.
79. See, e.g., Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-340, 122 Stat.
3735 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.A. (West 2009)) (criminalizing and granting
universal jurisdiction for an offense which industrialized Western nations like the United States
never commit); see also Bassiouni, supra note 28, at 50 ("Slavery, like piracy, has greatly
diminished in the last two centuries, and that may well have made it possible for states to
recognize the application of the theory of universal jurisdiction to what has heretofore been
essentially universally condemned.").
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prosecute") provisions in international conventions developed.80  The aut
dedere aut judicare provision in Article VII of the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft states: "The Contracting State in
the territory of which an alleged offender is found shall, if it does not extradite
him, be obliged without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offense
was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its competent authorities for
the purpose of prosecution."' This provision obligates the state party to try
alleged offenders found in its territory, unless the state extradites the offender.
It remains unclear when this obligation arises: Must the state prosecute in the
complete absence of any extradition requests, or only after other states have
made extradition requests and been rejected?82 State practice varies.83 At the
minimum aut dedere autjudicare provisions create an obligation to extradite;
at the maximum they obligate a state to prosecute an individual in its custody
based on universal jurisdiction.84 The principle of aut dedere autjudicare does
not support the exercise of unlimited universal jurisdiction, though such treaty
provisions usually do not preclude it, either.
8 5
While the exercise of universal jurisdiction by national courts has become
86more common in recent years, 6 conflicting dicta from the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) demonstrates that no clear international norm exists regarding
universal jurisdiction. A Belgian arrest warrant for the then-Foreign Minister
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, issued based on universal
jurisdiction,8 7 was appealed to the ICJ.88 The Congo withdrew its original
80. REYDAMS, supra note 37, at 61.
81. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft art. 7, Dec. 16, 1970,
22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105. This language is essentially a blueprint for aut dedere aut
judicare provisions copied almost verbatim in later conventions. REYDAMS, supra note 37, at
62. For a list of treaties using substantially similar language, see id. at 62 n.104. The
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
also substantially repeats this provision. Id. at 65. Reydams concludes that this convention too
fails to endorse the exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia. Id. at 67.
82. REYDAMS, supra note 37, at 63.
83. See id. ("National implementation practice is inconclusive.").
84. Bassiouni, supra note 28, at 55.
85. See, e.g., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft art. 4, para.
3, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 ("This Convention does not exclude any
criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law.").
86. See, e.g., infra Part II.C.1 (discussing Belgium's brief experiment with universal
jurisdiction); infra Part II.C.2 (discussing recent Spanish prosecutions under universal
jurisdiction).
87. See infra notes 105-108 and accompanying text (discussing Belgium's universal
jurisdiction legislation).
88. See Arrest Warrant of I 1 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 32-
33 (Feb. 14) (finding that the Belgian arrest warrant "failed to respect the immunity from
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challenge to universal jurisdiction and requested that the case be decided only
on the grounds of immunity.
8 9
Seven judges in the majority and dissent still discussed universal
jurisdiction in dicta, with three opposing and four endorsing Belgium's exercise
of unlimited universal jurisdiction.90 In a joint opinion, Judges Higgins,
Kooijmans, and Buergenthal addressed unlimited universal jurisdiction and
concluded, based upon an examination of international conventions and
customs, that no support for the practice exists. 9' However, unlimited universal
jurisdiction was not illegal, either; the three judges argued that state practice
with regard to it was neutral.92  Using the logic of the Lotus case-that
whatever international law does not prohibit states from doing, is permitted-
the judges rationalized that, as a neutral state practice, unlimited universal
jurisdiction did not violate international law and therefore was acceptable.
93
Perhaps this reasoning was carried to its natural conclusion by Judge Koroma,
who simply declared: "Belgium is entitled to invoke its criminal jurisdiction
against anyone, save a Foreign Minister [who has immunity]." 94
On the other side of the debate, President Guillaume and Judges
Ranjeva and Rezek disagreed. Judge Ranjeva took issue with the logic of the
Lotus case, which Belgium espoused in defense of universal jurisdiction; he
argued that the Lotus majority did not contemplate universal jurisdiction
when deciding the case and that the language of Lotus should be confined to
the facts of that case.95 Judge Ranjeva concluded that, in the absence of any
criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability which the incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs of
the Democratic Republic of Congo enjoyed under international law" and requiring Belgium to
cancel the arrest warrant).
89. Id. at 10, 19; see infra notes 118-123 and accompanying text (discussing the
subsequent history of the case in Belgian courts).
90. REYDAMS, supra note 37, at 228-30. These figures omit the two ad hoc judges, Judge
Bula Bula and Judge Van den Wyngaert, appointed by each party in order to insure national
representation on the court. See generally Arrest Warrant, 2002 I.C.J. at 100-36 (separate
opinion of Judge ad hoc Bula-Bula); id. at 137-87 (dissenting opinion of Judge adhoc Van den
Wyngaert). Universal jurisdiction in absentia, the term that the ICJ uniformly used for what
this Note refers to as unlimited universal jurisdiction, means essentially the same thing.
91. Arrest Warrant, 2002 I.C.J. at 68-76 (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins,
Kooijmans, and Buergenthal). At that time, "virtually all national legislation" and case law
involved some sort of connection to the forum state. Id. at 76.
92. Id. at 76. But see REYDAMS, supra note 37, at 230 (disagreeing with that contention
and pointing out that the exercise of unlimited universal jurisdiction usually evokes vigorous
protests from the states of the victims' nationality).
93. Arrest Warrant, 2002 I.C.J. at 77-80 (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins,
Kooijmans, and Buergenthal).
94. Id. at 61 (separate opinion of Judge Koroma).
95. Id. at 57-58 (declaration of Judge Ranjeva).
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connection to a prosecuting state, such a state has no authority to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over an absent defendant. 96 President Guillaume also
distinguished the Lotus case, arguing that the territorial principle of
jurisdiction has been strengthened by decolonialization and the U.N.
Charter's respect for sovereign equality.97 President Guillaume found no
support for unlimited universal jurisdiction under international law9" and
warned of its potential dangers:
[A]t no time has it been envisaged that jurisdiction should be conferred
upon courts of every State in the world to prosecute such crimes,
whoever their authors and victims and irrespective of the place where the
offender is to be found. To do this would, moreover, risk creating total
judicial chaos. It would also be to encourage the arbitrary for the benefit
of the powerful .... 9
Finally, Judge Rezek challenged Belgium's exercise of universal
jurisdiction,' ° stressing that African states refrain from investigating,
indicting, and prosecuting European leaders.'0 '
As the divided justices in the ICJ indicate, "there is no established
practice in which States exercise universal jurisdiction." 0 2 While other
nations have adopted unlimited universal jurisdiction, Belgium itself has
retreated from this radical stance.10 3 The concept of universal jurisdiction in
academic theory is very old, but in legal practice much newer; as an
international norm it is still developing. 1
4
96. Id. at 58 (declaration of Judge Ranjeva).
97. Id. at 43 (separate opinion of President Guillaume).
98. See id. at 42 ("[I]ntemational law knows only one true case of universal jurisdiction:
piracy."); id. at 44 ("[I]nternational law does not accept universal jurisdiction; still less does it
accept universal jurisdiction in absentia.").
99. Id. at 43.
100. See id. at 92 (separate opinion of Judge Rezek) ("In no way does international law as
it now stands allow for activist intervention, whereby a State seeks out on another State's
territory... an individual accused of crimes under public international law but having no
factual connection with the forum State.").
101. Id. at 93.
102. Id. at 76 (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal).
103. Infra note 124 and accompanying text.
104. See Stephen Macedo, Introduction to UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 28, at 1, 3
("[U]niversal jurisdiction is not new. It... is playing a growing role in the emerging regime of
international accountability for serious crimes. The challenge is to define that role and to clarify
when and how universal jurisdiction can be exercised responsibly.").
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C. Universal Jurisdiction in Action: Case Studies
1. Past and Present Jurisdiction in Belgium
In 1999, Belgium amended its law on genocide and other grave breaches
of international law,'0 5 essentially permitting Belgian courts to exercise
universal jurisdiction over these crimes regardless of where they are
committed.' 6 Under this law, "Belgium enabled itself to hear any case in the
world which is suspected of constituting a crime listed in the law, even without
the presence of suspects."'0 7 Combined with the ability of (even foreign)
victims to institute a criminal investigation and bypass prosecutorial
discretion,108 Belgium's universal jurisdiction had the potential to target any
international figure-and it did.
Investigations under the new law began modestly, with the prosecution of
four Rwandan grnocidaires who had significant connections to Belgium.1 9
One defendant allegedly typeset in Belgium a manifesto inciting the Rwandan
genocide,'° 1two other defendants had ties to Belgium even before the Rwandan
genocide, and all defendants had come to Belgium voluntarily."' Also
important from a jurisdictional viewpoint was the relative disinterest of
Rwanda, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the
defendants themselves in challenging the jurisdiction of the Belgian
prosecution." 2 These convictions were a success for universal jurisdiction, but
the nexus to the prosecuting state (which all defendants possessed) means that
it was hardly a victory for unlimited universal jurisdiction.
105. See Act Concerning the Punishment of Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law of March 23, 1999 art. 7, Moniteur Beige, English translation reprinted in
38 I.L.M. 918, 921-24 (1999) (defining and criminalizing genocide, torture, and other grave
breaches of international law).
106. See id. art. 1-4, at 921 ("The Belgian courts shall be competent to deal with breaches
provided for in the present Act, irrespective of where such breaches have been committed.").
107. INAzuMI, supra note 20, at 93.
108. See REYDAMs, supra note 37, at 108 (explaining the role of victims in the Belgian
legal system).
109. See generally Luc Reydams, Belgium's First Application of Universal Jurisdiction:
The Butare Four Case, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 428 (2003) (offering background information on
the case and insights from the author's personal observation of some of the trial).
110. Id.at430.
111. Id. at 434.
112. Id. The defendants actually received lighter sentences in Belgium than they would
have from the ICTR or Rwandan courts. Id. at 435.
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Success breeds imitation. Initial achievements under the universal
jurisdiction law led to a barrage of complaints and investigations. 113 Palestinian
refugees filed a complaint against then-Prime Minister of Israel Ariel Sharon,
and Israeli groups responded by going after Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat.l"
4
Other defendants included Hiss~ne Habrd, the former dictator of Chad; Laurent
Gbagbo, President of Ivory Coast; Denis Sasson-Nguesso, President of the
Congo Republic; Ange-F61ix Patass6, former President of the Central African
Republic; Fidel Castro, former President of Cuba; Saddam Hussein, former
President of Iraq; Hashemi Rafsanji, former President of Iran, and Paul
Kagame, President of Rwanda and leader of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (the
Tutsi rebel group that defeated the Hutu g6nocidaires and stopped the Rwandan
genocide). 1 5 Additionally, seven Iraqi victims brought charges of war crimes
against George H.W. Bush and Colin Powell for their role in the 1991 Gulf
War. 1 6 These cases typically had no nexus between the defendants and
Belgium. 117
Another defendant in this line of cases was Yerodia Abdoulaye Ndombasi,
then-Minster of Foreign Affairs for the Democratic Republic of the Congo." 
8
The internationally circulated arrest warrant issued in that case was appealed to
the ICJ and found to be illegal. 19 Later, on appeal to the chambre de mises en
accusation (a pre-trial appeals court), the Ndonbasi case' 2° was dismissed on
the grounds that the defendant was not present in Belgium. 121 The result of the
113. See REYDAMS, supra note 37, at 116 ("Victims of human rights violations from all
over the world flooded the Belgian authorities with complaints. Hardly a month went by
without some international outcast being indicted .... ").
114. Marlise Simons, Human Rights Cases Begin to Flood into Belgian Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 27, 2001, at A8.
115. Id.
116. Stephen Cviic, Belgium Drops War Crimes Cases, BBC NEws, Sept. 24, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3135934.stm (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
117. See, e.g., REYDAMS, supra note 37, at 116 (noting the absence of any connection
between Belgium and Ndombasi, save for a large Congolese community); id. at 117 (noting the
absence of any connecting links between Belgium and Ariel Sharon).
118. Supra note 88. For a discussion ofArrest Warrant of 11 April2000, see supra notes
88-101 and accompanying text.
119. Id.
120. Public Prosecutor v. Ndombasi, chambre de mises en accusation of Brussels, Apr. 16,
2002, available at http://www.ulb.ac.be/droitcdi/Site/Legislationfiles/Arret%2016%2Oavril%
202002.pdf.
121. See REYDAMS, supra note 37, at 116 ("The appeals decision in Public Prosecutor v
Ndombasi et al. limits the exercise of universal jurisdiction under the War Crimes Act to cases
where the foreign suspect is voluntarily present in Belgium.").
1332
DOES THE WORLD NEED KNIGHTS ERRANT?
appeal in the Sharon case 12 2 was similar: "The chambre de mises en accusation
in Brussels (differently composed than in Ndombasi) declared the proceedings
inadmissible because the defendant was not present" and "opined, moreover,
that the exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia is contrary to the
Genocide Convention, the Geneva Conventions,... and the principle of
sovereign equality of States."'
' 23
After the United States inevitably voiced its opposition to Belgium's
politically motivated prosecutions of its officials, Belgium seriously limited the
jurisdiction of its courts. 24 Belgian law now requires that the prosecuted crime
be committed against a Belgian national or legal resident of Belgium. 25
Unlimited universal jurisdiction thus proved to be a wasted effort for Belgium,
drawing fire from both allies abroad and Belgium's own judiciary. Most
importantly, however, it failed to produce any convictions in the absence of
connecting links. Despite the best intentions behind the Belgian law, justice
and accountability could not be achieved by means of unlimited universal
jurisdiction.
2 6
122. Abbas Hijazi v. Sharon, chambre de mises en accusation of Brussels, June 26, 2002,
available at www.ulb.ac.be/droit/cdi/Site/Legislationfiles/arret%2026%20juin%202002%
20apercu.pdf. The Sharon case was then appealed to the Court of Cassation, which did not
address the issue of universal jurisdiction. See H.S.A. v. S.A., 42 I.L.M. 596, 600 (Cass. 2003)
(reversing on grounds of immunity). For a deeper discussion of the Sharon case, see generally
Antonio Cassesse, The Belgian Court of Cassation v. The International Court of Justice: The
Sharon and Others Case, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 437 (2003).
123. REYDAMS, supra note 37, at 117.
124. See Belgium: Universal Jurisdiction Law Repealed, HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, July 31,
2003, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2003/08/01/belgium-universal-jurisdiction-law-repealed
(last visited Sept. 29, 2009) (reporting on the disappointed reaction of human rights groups to
the repeal of Belgium's universal jurisdiction law) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). The United States threatened to move NATO headquarters out of Belgium if the
country's exercise of universal jurisdiction was not curtailed because American military officials
like Donald Rumsfeld were unable to go there without fearing arrest. Id.
125. See Belgium's Amendment to the Law of June 15, 1993 (As Amended by the Law
Feb. 10, 1999 and Apr. 23, 2003) Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of
Humanitarian Law art. 13, Moniteur Belge, English translation reprinted in 42 I.L.M. 1258,
1265-66 (2003) (granting immunity to persons invited to Belgium by the government of an
international organization with its headquarters in Belgium); id. art. 16, at 1266-67 (limiting
jurisdiction to crimes committed against nationals or legal residents of at least three years and
tightening criminal investigation and prosecution mechanisms).
126. See REYDAMs, supra note 37, at 118 ("This situation fuels the criticism that the
proceedings in absentia against the world's villains are window-dressing.").
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2. Unlimited Universal Jurisdiction in Spain
Spain currently exercises broader universal jurisdiction than any other
country. The Spanish law permitting the exercise of universal jurisdiction has
been on the books since 1985, permitting the prosecution of foreign defendants
for genocide, terrorism, and other crimes under international law, regardless of
where they were committed. 27 Also, under Spanish law, victims and public
interest organizations may file complaints which proceed at the discretion of the
investigating magistrate, even over the objections of the prosecutor.12' The
combination of unlimited universal jurisdiction and lack of prosecutorial
discretion, characteristics that Spain shared with Belgium,' 29 predictably led to
similar results.
30
As in Belgium, prosecutions under this statute began by focusing on
crimes against Spanish victims. In 1996, members of the Spanish Union of
Progressive Prosecutors filed a complaint against members of the Argentine
military junta, accusing them of genocide, terrorism, and other crimes against
"disappeared" Spanish citizens living in Argentina during its repressive
regime. 31 The case was assigned to Judge Baltazar Garz6n, who began an
investigation into Operation Condor, a conspiracy by South American
dictatorships to cooperate in the elimination of their dissidents.' 32 During the
course of this investigation, Judge Garz6n issued over a hundred indictments
and warrants for various South American military officers. 133  The first
defendant to be arrested and convicted was Adolfo Scilingo, a former
Argentine naval officer accused of throwing prisoners out of airplanes, who had
voluntarily come to Spain to testify about past abuses committed by the ruling
127. See Ley Orgdnica del Poder Judicial [L.O.P.J.] art. 23(4) ("Spanish courts will be
equally capable of exercising jurisdiction over crimes [including genocide, terrorism, piracy,
and other crimes which Spain has a legal obligation to prosecute] committed by Spanish people
or by foreigners outside the national territory.... ").
128. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Precedent and Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEw
ENG. L. REv. 311, 311 (2001).
129. See supra note 106 (authorizing unlimited universal jurisdiction in Belgium); supra
note 108 and accompanying text (permitting foreign victims to file complaints in Belgium).
130. Compare supra notes 114-116 and accompanying text (listing fruitless complaints
and indictments in Belgium), with infra notes 139, 164, 166 and accompanying text (describing
the same outcome for investigations and extradition attempts in Spain).
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junta. 134 A second defendant, Ricardo Cavillo, was extradited to Spain from
Mexico to stand trial for atrocities committed against Spanish nationals.
135
One of the warrants Judge Garz6n issued was for General Augusto
Pinochet, the former dictator of Chile, accusing him of genocide, terrorism, and
torture. 136 Pinochet was arrested in England, and the outcome of three hearings
by the House of Lords allowed him to be extradited. 137 Rather than going to
Spain, however, he was determined to be medically unfit to stand trial and
returned to Chile. 13 Pinochet never stood trial for his crimes.
1 39
Despite this failure to secure a conviction, the Pinochet case is regarded as
a landmark case. 140 It represents the first time a head of state was (almost) held
accountable for abuses committed during his regime. 41 For a variety of
reasons, however, it is immaterial to an analysis of universal jurisdiction. At
the core of its complaint, Spain was asserting passive personality jurisdiction
over Pinochet on behalf of Spanish victims of his rule.' 42 The House of Lords
relied upon national, not international, law to find jurisdiction, 43 and the
Spanish legal decisions surrounding the charges against Pinochet have since
been superseded by developments in the later Guatemalan cases. 44  The
134. 'Dirty War' Officer Found Guilty, BBC NEWS, Apr. 19, 2005, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/europe/4460871.stm (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
135. Cavillo in Spain to Stand Trial, CNN NEWS, June 29, 2003, http://www.
cnn.com/2003/WORLD/americas/06/28/cavallo.mexico (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
136. Richard A. Falk, Assessing the Pinochet Litigation: Whither Universal Jurisdiction?,
in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 28, at 97, 106-07.
137. See id. at 110-18 (discussing in detail the three phases of the Pinochet extradition
request). The British decisions relied upon domestic implementation legislation of the Torture
Convention rather than customary norms of international law. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 128, at
314.
138. Pinochet Escapes Torture Trial Charges, BBC NEWS, Mar. 2, 2000,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/2/newsid_2771000/2771229.stm (last
visited Sept. 29, 2009) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
139. Id.
140. See Falk, supra note 136, at 97 ("Typical of the comments on this legal pursuit of
Pinochet were the following: 'pathbreaking,' 'breathtaking,' 'a decision without precedent...
[a] beginning for what can and should be justice without borders,' and a course of litigation that
has 'already revolutionized international law.'").
141. Id. at 119.
142. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 128, at 314.
143. Id.
144. For a discussion of the November 5, 1998 decision of the Spanish National Court
upholding jurisdiction over the Chilean and Argentine defendants, see id. at 313.
1335
66 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1315 (2009)
Pinochet case did, however, provide a precedent for Spain's subsequent
transnational prosecutions.
In December 1999, Nobel Peace Prize winner Rigoberta Menchii filed a
complaint in Spain alleging the commission of genocide, torture, and other
crimes during the thirty years of civil war in Guatemala. 45 During this
internecine conflict, which claimed over 200,000 lives, the Spanish embassy
had been firebombed and four Spanish priests disappeared or were killed.
146
The complaint included these crimes connected to Spain but focused mainly on
the genocide allegedly committed against Guatemala's indigenous Mayan
population. 47 A judicial investigation into the complaint began, but the Public
Prosecutor's Office challenged the judge's jurisdiction and the National Court
ruled that Spanish courts had no jurisdiction.148
The matter was appealed to Spain's Supreme Court, which upheld the
lower court's ruling. 49 The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the
Genocide Convention established the exercise of universal jurisdiction; 150 other
international treaties containing aut dedere autjudicare provisions also fail to
provide for universal jurisdiction.' 5' The opinion required that the unlimited
universal jurisdiction that domestic Spanish law authorizes be exercised in
accordance with international law, 5 2 and international law opposes the idea that
any "State may unilaterally establish order through criminal law, against
everyone and the entire world, without there being some point of connection
which legitimatizes the extraterritorial extension of its jurisdiction."'153 The
Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized "the relevance of a legitimizing link to
national interest, within the framework of universal jurisdiction" as the
justification for denying jurisdiction over charges of genocide committed
against Guatemala's Mayans. 154 It also upheld jurisdiction for the charges
145. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 15, at 84.
146. Id. at 83.
147. Id. at 84
148. Id. at 85.
149. See Sentencia Tribunal Supremo [STS], Feb. 25, 2003, translated in 42 I.L.M. 686,
702-03 (2003) (deciding that Spanish courts had no jurisdiction to hear charges of genocide
against members of the Guatemalan government).
150. See id. at 695 ("The [Genocide] Convention does not establish universal jurisdiction,
nor does it exclude it.").
151. See id. at 699-701 (examining jurisdiction under several multilateral treaties to which
Spain is a party).
152. See id. at 697 ("As a general rule, the foresight of Spanish law must make itself
compatible with the requirements derived from international law...
153. Id. at 698.
154. Id. at 701.
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regarding the firebombing of the Spanish embassy and the deaths of the
Spanish priests, based upon passive personality jurisdiction.
155
The case then went before the highest court in Spain, the Constitutional
Court, which reversed the Supreme Court's ruling. 156 The Constitutional Court
rejected the lower court's conception of connecting links for too narrowly
focusing on the nationality of the victims, the location of the defendants, and
Spain's national interest in the investigation, when genocide is an international
crime "transcend[ing] the particular victims and reach[ing] the international
community as a whole.'0 57 A broad scope for universal jurisdiction, it felt, was
necessary to give full effect to the noble aspirations for which the doctrine was
designed.
58
With jurisdiction established, the next step in bringing the Guatemalan
defendants to justice was to gather evidence and extradite the accused. In July
2006, a Spanish judge issued six warrants for the arrest of former high-ranking
Guatemalan officials, and, in November 2006, a Guatemalan trial court
executed four of the warrants.159 The defendants filed legal challenges, and, in
December 2007, Guatemala's Constitutional Court held that the extradition
requests based upon universal jurisdiction violated Guatemala's sovereignty. 160
The response to this decision and the subsequent release of the defendants was
predictably negative from human rights quarters, 16' but more unusual was the
reaction of the Spanish judge on the case, who issued a written response to
Guatemala's Constitutional Court.162 The opinion lambasted the Guatemalan
judiciary for failing to fulfill their international obligations and vowed to
continue on even without Guatemalan support.163 To achieve this end, the
155. Id. at 702.
156. See Sentencia Tribunal Constitucional Sisteinatizadas y Comentadas [STC], Sept. 26,
2005, at 27, translation available at http://www.cja.org/cases/GuatemalaDocs/sccjurisdiction
_english.pdf at 27 (holding that Spanish jurisdiction did exist over the charges of genocide).
157. Id. at 26.
158. Id.
159. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 15, at 87.
160. Id. at 80.
161. For a discussion of the verdict from a human rights standpoint, see Martha Fanesca,
Guatemala: Constitutional Court VerdictExemplifies Impunity, UPSIDE DOWN WORLD, Jan. 23,
2008, http://upsidedownworld.org/main/content/view/1097/33 (last visited Sept. 29, 2009)
("Legal experts confirm that the verdict contains arbitrary legal jargon that is not based on the
law.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
162. See generally D. Santiago J. Pedraz G6mez, Spanish National Court Response to the
Guatemalan Constitutional Court, Jan. 16, 2008, translation available at
http://www.cja.org/cases/GuatemalaDocs/response-to-guatedecisionenglish.pdf (criticizing
the decision of Guatemala's Constitutional Court).
163. Id. at 5-6.
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judge called upon Guatemalan, Mexican, Belizean, Honduran, Nicaraguan, El
Salvadoran, and American media outlets to broadcast an announcement for
witnesses to the Mayan genocide to come forward and provide evidence.' 64 No
trials have resulted yet from the Guatemala investigation.
Spain also seems to be the forum of choice for investigations against
Chinese officials for atrocities committed in Tibet. In January 2006, the
Spanish National Court began investigation into acts of genocide committed in
Tibet and later added charges for offenses committed against members of the
Falun Gong. 165 Given Spain's ban on trials in absentia and the unlikely
possibility that China will extradite its former head-of-state, "a trial is virtually
excluded."
66
More recently, Spain's Congress of Deputies voted almost unanimously to
limit the exercise of universal jurisdiction only to defendants present in
Spain. 167  The measure still must pass the Senate and will only apply
prospectively, permitting investigations in current cases to continue.' 68 Spain
may also amend its universal jurisdiction legislation in order to prevent it from
being used against Israel.169 While Spain is not the only country with unlimited
jurisdiction, 70 it is the doctrine's most fervent practitioner, and these reversals
demonstrate the political impracticability of unlimited universal jurisdiction. 171
164. Id. at 6-7.
165. See Christine A.E. Bakker, Universal Jurisdiction ofSpanish Courts over Genocide in
Tibet: Can It Work?, 4 J. INT'L CraM. JUST. 595, 595, 601 n.21 (2006) (recounting early
attempts to hold Chinese officials accountable for genocide in Tibet).
166. Id. at 601.
167. Andrew Morgan, Spain Lower House Votes to Limit Reach of Universal Jurisdiction
Statute, JURIST, June. 25, 2009, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2009/06/spain-lower-house-
votes-to-limit-reach.php (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
168. Id.
169. Barak Ravide, Spanish FM: We 'llAct to Prevent War Crimes Probes Against Israel,
HAARETZ SERVICE, Jan. 1, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1059964.html (last
visited Sept. 29, 2009) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
170. See, e.g., REYDAMS, supra note 37, at 142-45 (discussing Germany's new Code of
Crimes Against International Law (V6lkerstrafgesetzbuch), which overrides ajudicially imposed
requirement of connecting links and mandates unlimited universal jurisdiction). For a
discussion of the most significant case brought under universal jurisdiction in Germany, see
Scott Lyons, German Criminal Complaint Against Donald Rums/eld and Others, ASIL
INSIGHTS, Dec. 14, 2006, http://www.asil.org/insights06l2l4.cfin (last visited Sept. 29, 2009)
(discussing Germany's use of universal jurisdiction to investigate allegations of torture
committed by Americans at Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). Due to its popularity among human rights advocates, unlimited jurisdiction has
survived several challenges and may yet do so again.
171. But see Antonio Cassesse, Is the Bell Tollingfor Universality? A Pleafor a Sensible
Notion of Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 589,595 (2003) (sounding prematurely
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3. Universal Jurisdiction in the United States of America
By the early nineteenth century, universal jurisdiction in the United States
was well established for piracy. For example, in United States v. Klintock
7 2
the Attorney General argued: "A pirate, being hosti humani generis, is of no
nation or state.... All the States of the world are engaged in a tacit alliance
against them. An offence committed by them against any individual nation, is
an offence against all. It is punishable in the Courts of all.0 73 Chief Justice
Marshall declared that pirates "are proper objects for the penal code of all
nations.' 74 Distinguishing between pirates "acting in defiance of all law" and
privateers acting "under the acknowledged authority of a foreign State,"175 the
Klintock Court believed Congress should exercise universal jurisdiction over
"offenses committed against all nations, including the United States, by persons
who by common consent are equally amenable to the laws of all nations."
76
The United States has been slower to embrace more modem grounds for
universal jurisdiction. 177  The Third Restatement of American Foreign
Relations Law expressly recognized universal jurisdiction,178 but the
Restatement did not yet reflect the actual law of the United States. 79 In the
1990s, several hijacking cases relied upon a combination of universal
jurisdiction and passive personality to exercise jurisdiction over the
"the death knell for absolute universal jurisdiction (which one could also term 'universality
unbound' or 'wild exercise of extraterritorial judicial authority')" after the Spanish Supreme
Court's decision).
172. See United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144,153 (1820) (holding that an act
of Congress granting federal jurisdiction to specific acts constituting piracy "does extend to all
persons on board all vessels which throw off their national character by cruizing [sic] piratically
and committing piracy on other vessels").
173. Id. at 147-48.
174. Id. at 152.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See INAZUMI, supra note 20, at 77-78 (discussing America's lack of speed in passing
domestic legislation authorizing universal jurisdiction over modem violations of international
law).
178. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 404 (1987) ("A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain offenses
recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade....
hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism, even where [no
territorial, nationality, or protective jurisdiction] is present.").
179. See INAZuMI, supra note 20, at 77 ("Although the Third Restatement published in
1987 explicitly acknowledged universal jurisdiction over genocide and other crimes, the actual
domestic legislation in the United States did not lay down such broad jurisdiction in the
1980s.").
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defendants.180 After becoming a party to the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the United
States extended jurisdiction for the crime of torture to cover extraterritorial
commissions regardless of the nationality of the offender or victim, as long as
"the alleged offender is present in the United States, irrespective of the
nationality of the victim or alleged offender."18' 1 Also notable is the Maritime
Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), l1 2 which permits the exercise of
American police power and jurisdiction over foreign nationals aboard foreign
vessels in international waters.
1 83
180. See United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (affirming the
district court's exercise of passive personality and universal jurisdiction over a hijacker) (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 404, 423
(1987)); United States v. Yousef, 927 F. Supp. 673, 679-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (exercising
territorial jurisdiction over charges of a conspiracy to simultaneously bomb eleven American
passenger planes operating out of the Philippines and universal jurisdiction over a death and
injuries caused as part of that conspiracy "since the crimes charged have a 'substantial, direct
and foreseeable' effect in the United States"). The Yousef court dismissed the defendants'
arguments against universal jurisdiction, finding that "[a]ny constitutionally required nexus to
the United States is clearly present." Id. at 682.
181. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(b)(2) (2006).
182. See 46 U.S.C. § 70503 (2006) (criminalizing possession "with intent to manufacture
or distribute, a controlled substance on board.. . a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States"); id. § 70504 ("Jurisdiction of the United States with respect to a vessel subject to
this chapter is not an element of an offense. Jurisdictional issues arising under this chapter are
preliminary questions of law to be determined solely by the trial judge."); id. § 70505 (denying
standing to individuals raising failure to comply with international law as a defense).
183. See generally Eugene Kontorovich, Beyond the Article I Horizon: Congress's
Enumerated Powers and Universal Jurisdiction over Drug Crimes, 93 MINN. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2009) (examining the constitutionality under Article I of universal jurisdiction
exercised under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act without any nexus to the United
States). Defendants under the MDLEA often raise due process challenges when their
prosecuted behavior has no connection to the United States; a circuit split over this issue has
developed, with the Ninth Circuit alone requiring some connecting link in order to satisfy due
process. Compare United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 553 (lst Cir. 1999) ("[D]ue process
does not require the government to prove a nexus between a defendant's criminal conduct and
the United States in a prosecution under the MDLEA when the flag nation has consented to the
application of United States law to the defendants."), and United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo,
993 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding congressional intent to override international law
to the extent that a connecting link to the prosecuting state might be required, and rejecting due
process arguments on the grounds that drug trafficking is "condemned universally by law-
abiding nations"), with United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1255 (9th Cir.
1998) ("Before a United States court may entertain a prosecution for violation of the Act, there
must be a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the United States so that such application
would not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.") (citations omitted). Insofar as the defendant's
state of nationality almost always consents to the exercise of American jurisdiction,
Kontorovich, supra, manuscript at 12, this exercise ofjurisdiction can be distinguished from the
others discussed in this Note as sui generis.
1340
DOES THE WORLD NEED KNIGHTS ERRANT?
A recent spate of lawmaking under the Bush Administration further
extended the reach of universal jurisdiction in the United States. The Genocide
Accountability Act of 2007184 extended the jurisdictional elements of genocide
to be met when, "after the conduct required for the offense occurs, the alleged
offender is brought into, or found in, the United States, even if that conduct
occurred outside the United States."8 5 Individuals found in the United States
may also be prosecuted for using child soldiers under the Child Soldier
Accountability Act of 2008.186
The latest development in American universal jurisdiction jurisprudence
occurred in October 2008, when Charles "Chuckie" Taylor Jr., the son of
former Liberian president Charles Taylor, was convicted of torture by a federal
court in Miami-the first prosecution under § 2340A.1 87 On January 9, 2009,
Chuckie Taylor was sentenced to ninety-seven years in prison. 88 As a dual
citizen of Liberia and the United States, the Taylor trial was not based upon
universal jurisdiction, but it did lead to a discussion of the constitutionality of
that doctrine. 1
89
Taylor's defense challenged the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2340A,
claiming that it attempted "to oversee, through the open-ended terms of federal
criminal law-the internal and wholly domestic actions of a foreign
government.' 190 The defense began its assault on the statute by questioning the
184. See Genocide Accountability Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-151, 121 Stat. 1821
(codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1091 (West 2009)) (defining genocide, the punishment for genocide,
and the required circumstances for the offense).
185. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1091(d)(5) (West 2009).
186. See Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-340, 122 Stat. 3735
(codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.A. (West 2009)) (granting jurisdiction for the
recruitment or use of child soldiers regardless of nationality for a defendant present in the
United States).
187. See Yolanne Almanzar, Son of Ex-President ofLiberia Is Convicted of Torture, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 30, 2008, at A16 (reporting on the trial of Chuckie Taylor). For a fascinating
biography of Chuckie Taylor, see generally Johnny Dwyer, American Warlord, ROLLING STONE,
Sept. 18, 2008, at 86, available at http://www.rollingstone.com/news/story/22828415/
american warlord.
188. Taylor's Son Jailed for 97 Years, BBC NEWS, Jan. 9, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.ukl2/hi/americas/7820069.stm (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
189. See Elise Keppler et al., First Prosecution in the United States for Torture Committed
Abroad: The Trial of Charles 'Chuckie' Taylor, Jr., 15 No. 3 WASH. C. L. HuM. RTS. BRIEF 18,
20 (2008), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/ 5/3keppler.pdf ("In rejecting the
defense's arguments, the court nevertheless based some of its reasoning on the fact that the
defendant is a U.S. citizen. Accordingly, a future constitutional challenge to the statute may yet
raise issues of first impression if a noncitizen is facing prosecution.").
190. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment, and Memorandum of Law in Support
Thereof, Based on the Unconstitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2340A, Both on Its Face and As
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power of Congress to legislate over torture committed in Liberia under the
Commerce Clause or the Define and Punish Clause. m9' Taylor also objected to
the vague language of the statute
192 and, presumably, universal jurisdiction.
93
Taylor's best argument may have been that there is a presumption against
extraterritoriality when construing statutes, and the charges of carrying and
using a firearm in commission of the federal crime (extraterritorial torture)
should be dropped.' 94
Judge Altovar rejected the defendant's arguments in their entirety. 95 The
court found that Congress had the power to enact § 2340A through the
Necessary and Proper Clause, or alternately, the Define and Punish Clause.
1 96
The Taylor case thus creates a strong precedent for the constitutionality of
American exercises of universal jurisdiction and the authority of Congress to
criminalize extraterritorial violations of international law. 197 This conviction
also strongly suggests that, in the future, the United States will no longer be "a
Applied to the Allegations of the Indictment, at 1, United States v. Emmanuel, No. 06-20758-
CR, 2007 WL 2002452 (S.D. Fla. July 5,2007) [hereinafter Defendant's Motion], available at
2007 WL 980550.
191. Id. at 2-8.
192. See id. at 19 ("The statute simply does not provide a defendant in this situation with
sufficient guidance... creating an irresolvable dilemma for a foreign government officer in
trying to determine a myriad of differing views, among hundreds of nations and cultures, as to
what is an inappropriate level of suffering.").
193. See id. at 10 ("Nor does the universality principle of jurisdiction warrant
extraterritorial application of the instant statute. Here, there was a clear locus of the offense and
harm-Liberia-and no harm, no matter how broadly that is defined, is even remotely
connected to the United States."). This passage, the only mention of universal jurisdiction per
se within the motion to dismiss, actually sounds more like an articulation of the effects doctrine.
See supra note 22 and accompanying text (explaining the effects doctrine of territorial
jurisdiction).
194. Defendant's Motion, supra note 190, at 10-12. Universal jurisdiction does not exist
(or at least it did not exist until now) for such an offense.
195. United States v. Emmanuel, No. 06-20758-CR, 2007 WL 2002452, at *18 (S.D. Fla.
July 5, 2007).
196. Id. at *9. The court found that the Necessary and Proper Clause would allow
Congress to pass implementing legislation for the Torture Convention, while the Define and
Punish Clause (which gives Congress the power to "define and punish Piracies and Felonies on
the high seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10) would
permit Congress to pass legislation punishing violations of international law committed outside
the United States. Id. at *18.
197. Accord BriefAmici Curiae Submitted by International Human Rights Organizations
Opposing Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment at 1-3, United States v. Emmanuel,
No. 06-20758-CR, 2007 WL 2002452 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 2,2007), availableat2007 WL 1301622
(citing the Define and Punish Clause, the principle ofaut dedere autjudicare, and international
law as support for a finding of constitutionality).
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hideout for these hideous henchmen who have been involved in war crimes
around the world."'198
III. Civil Liability and Jurisdiction
"[U]niversal criminal jurisdiction necessarily contemplates a significant
degree of civil tort recovery as well."' 99 This Note uses the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS) 20 0 of the United States as the model for the expansive civil jurisdiction
which should accompany criminal jurisdiction in order to provide the fullest
redress to victims of atrocities. Other methods of remedy exist, such as the
partie civile system20 and the Trust Fund for Victims at the International
Criminal Court,20 2 but this discussion focuses on the ATS because, unlike the
previously mentioned options, a civil suit in a common law system can succeed
even when a criminal trial is impossible.
A. Jurisdiction for Civil Liability in the United States: The Alien Tort
Statute
The ATS creates remarkably expansive civil jurisdiction for violations of
international law. The statute declares: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 20 3 The requirements of
the ATS are thus rather simple: "(1) an alien sues (2) for a tort (3) committed
198. No Safe Haven: Accountability for Human Rights Violators in the United States:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and the Law, 110th Cong. 2(2007) (statement
of Sen. Richard J. Durbin).
199. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 763 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring).
200. See Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) ("The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States."). The ATS is also known as the Alien Tort
Claims Act.
201. See Jeremy Sarkin, Reparations for Gross Human Rights Violations As an Outcome of
Criminal Versus Civil Court Proceedings, in OUT OF THE ASHES: REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF
GROSS AND SYSTEMATIC HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 151, 171-73 (K. De Feyter et al. eds.,
2005) (describing the partie civile system, in which victims join a civil suit to a pending
criminal case and act as co-prosecutors in order to receive reparations).
202. See Pablo de Grieff & Marieke Wierda, The Trust Fund for Victims of the
International Criminal Court: Between Possibilities and Constraints, in OUT OF THE ASHES,
supra note 201, at 225, 225-43 (describing the International Criminal Court's method of
providing victims with reparations).
203. ATS, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
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in violation of the law of nations (i.e., international law). ' , 204 Part II.A. 1 traces
the historical development of the ATS, while Part II.A.2 examines jurisdiction
under the ATS.
1. The Development of the Alien Tort Statute
There is "a poverty of drafting history" on the ATS, enacted as part of the
Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, and "a consensus understanding of what
Congress intended has proven elusive., 205 Early cases discussing the ATS were
content to use it as the basis of jurisdiction for causes of action alleging
violations of international law.206 Until the 1980s, the potentially revolutionary
statute lay dormant.20 7
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala208 was the first modern case to apply the ATS to
violations of international norms.209 Examining the language of the Alien Tort
204. Kadic v. Karad~i6, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995).
205. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 718-19 (2004) (majority opinion).
206. See, e.g., Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810, 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607) (relying on
the ATS for jurisdiction in a suit involving mortgaged slaves captured by a French privateer);
Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942, 948 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895) (implying that the ATS
would provide jurisdiction for the violation of an American treaty if the suit was for a tort only
and not for the return of property).
207. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712 ("[F]or over 170 years after its enactment [the ATS]
provided jurisdiction in only one case.").
208. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that torture
violates "universally accepted norms of the international law of human rights" and thus federal
jurisdiction exists for suits against torturers under the ATS). The Filartiga family brought a suit
against Pena-Irala, an Inspector General of Police in Paraguay, alleging that he tortured and
murdered their son because of the family's opposition to the Paraguayan regime in power at the
time. Id. The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, but the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed, finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1350 granted jurisdiction. Id. at 880,889.
The Filartiga Court examined international law and concluded that an international norm
against torture existed. Id. at 881-84. Thus, the plaintiffs claim was "undeniably an action by
an alien, for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations" receiving federal
jurisdiction under the ATS. Id. at 887.
209. DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 161 (2d ed. 2005).
An earlier, extremely interesting child custody suit between aliens had used § 1350 for the basis
of jurisdiction in 1961, with the concealment of the child's name on a passport providing the
necessary violation of the law of nations. See Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 862-63,866-67
(D. Md. 1961) (finding that a child custody dispute constitutes a tort under the ATS, ignoring
the preclusive effect of a judgment from the Religious Court of Beirut, applying the equitable
best-interests-of-the-child standard, instead of Lebanese law, and tersely awarding custody to
the mother in America). While citing Adra as precedent, Filartiga's analysis of the sources of
international law is far more cosmopolitan. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887 n.21 (citing Adra and
Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607), as rare instances when § 1350 was
used as a basis forjurisdiction). Compare id. at 880-85 (following the comprehensive approach
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Statute, the Filartiga court reasoned that the statute does not grant new rights to
aliens, but simply allows the federal courts to adjudicate existing rights
recognized under international law.210  The Filartiga court distinguished
between behavior that is universally condemned, such as theft or fraud,2" and
that which truly rises to the level of a violation of the law of nations.
212
Importantly, the act of state doctrine was rejected in dictum as a defense for the
defendant's actions, depriving him of the ability to hide behind the protective
cloak of state authority.21 3 The Filartiga court concluded that "for purposes of
civil liability, the torturer has become like the pirate and slave trader before him
hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind."
214
The landmark holding of Filartiga marked the beginning of a wave of
litigation under the ATS in federal courts, including class action suits.
2 1 5
Notably, a class action against Ferdinand Marcos, the former dictator of the
Philippines, produced a jury verdict of over $750 million in compensatory
damages and $1.2 billion in punitive damages.216 And with the passage of
to interpreting international norms and custom advocated by The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S.
677 (1900), and Article 38 of the International Court of Justice; examining the United Nations
Charter, General Assembly resolutions, international conventions, and foreign judicial opinions
to hold that torture violates international law), with Adra, 195 F. Supp. at 863-65 (examining
treatises to distinguish between the law of nations and private international law, but only using
American and Lebanese law-and only citing American cases-to conclude that falsifying a
passport is a violation of the law of nations).
210. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980).
211. See id. at 888 ("[O]nly where the nations of the world have demonstrated that the
wrong is of mutual, and not merely several, concern, by means of express international accords,
that a wrong generally recognized becomes an international law violation within the meaning of
the statute."). The Filartiga court referred to precedent which "noted that the mere fact that
every nation's municipal law may prohibit theft does not incorporate 'the Eighth
Commandment, "Thou shalt not steal" ... [into] the law of nations."' Id. (citing IIT v. Vencap,
519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly, J.)).
212. See id. at 888-89 ("Here, the nations have made it their business, both through
international accords and unilateral action, to be concerned with domestic human rights
violations of this magnitude.").
213. See id. at 889 ("[W]e doubt whether action by a state official in violation of the
Constitution and laws of the Republic of Paraguay, and wholly ungratified by that nation's
government, could properly be characterized as an act of state.").
214. Id. at 890. The opinion went on to prophesy: "Our holding today, giving effect to a
jurisdictional provision enacted by our First Congress, is a small but important step in the
fulfillment of the ageless dream to free all people from brutal violence." Id.
215. See SHELTON, supra note 209, at 163-71 (summarizing the cases under the ATS
following the landmark Filartiga decision).
216. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789, 791 (9th Cir. 1996). Four hundred fifty
million dollars of the estate's assets were hidden in Swiss banks, but the Swiss Federal Court
ordered the release of the funds to the Philippine Government for the purpose of compensating
victims, who have yet to see any money. For a complete discussion of the litigation and
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the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA),2 17 Congress expressed its
approval of Filartiga.218 The TVPA codified the holding of Filartiga,
authorizing civil suits against aliens who commit torture or extrajudicial
killings.219
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,220 the United States Supreme Court
considered the ATS for the first time.221 A majority reaffirmed Filartiga's
interpretation of the ATS, while clarifying and limiting the scope of
jurisdiction under § 1350.222 The Court rejected the argument that the ATS
created "a new cause of action for torts in violation of international law,"
instead finding the statute to be strictly jurisdictional.223 Examining the
background in which the ATS was passed, the Court concluded that the
statute was meant to "furnish jurisdiction for a relatively modest set of
actions alleging violations of the law of nations., 224 Because the ATS was
"intended to have practical effect the moment it became law, 225 it is "best
read as having been enacted on the understanding that the common law
would provide a cause of action for the modest number of international law
violations with a potential for personal liability at the time., 226 When
Congress passed the ATS, three violations of the law of nations could be
considered torts: infringements of the rights of ambassadors, violations of
safe conducts, and piracy.227 Both the common law and international law
have developed since that time, and the Court found nothing to preclude
federal courts from recognizing new violations of the law of nations as
subsequent attempts to enforce the judgment, see ILARIA BorTnLRO, REDRESS FOR VICTIMS OF
CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 58-61 (2004).
217. Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992)
(codified at 28 U.S.C § 1350 note (2000)).
218. See S. REP. No. 102-249, at 3 (1991) (citing Filartiga with approval). The Senate
Report also quotes some of the Filartiga decision's more aspirational language, discussed supra
note 214 and accompanying text. Id.
219. See id. ("The TVPA would establish an unambiguous basis for a cause of action that
has been successfully maintained under an existing law [28 U.S.C. § 1350] .... ").
220. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 738 (2004) (holding that "a single illegal
detention of less than a day, followed by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a
prompt arraignment, violates no norm of customary international law so well defined as to
support the creation of a federal remedy").
221. SHELTON, supra note 209, at 161.
222. Id.
223. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713.
224. Id. at 720.
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common law torts.228 However, the majority urged caution 229 and required
that new causes of action permitted by federal courts not have "less definite
content and acceptance among civilized nations" than the three original torts
envisioned by Congress.2 30  Thus, violations of international law such as
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and torture-crimes for which
universal jurisdiction is typically exercised-are causes of action under the
ATS.231
2. Jurisdiction Under the Alien Tort Statute
For jurisdiction under § 1350, the location where the tort was committed
and the nationality of the defendant are irrelevant.232 If the plaintiffs meet the
requirements of the statute, the only connecting links necessary between the
defendant and the United States are the minimum contacts required for the
exercise of personal jurisdiction by federal courts.233 Because the Supreme
Court has found that personal presence within a jurisdiction satisfies these
234minimum contacts, proper service of process on a defendant within the
territory of the United States is the only connection to the judicial forum that
the ATS requires.235 This transient or "tag" jurisdiction is a key difference from
the jurisdictional regimes of the European Union,236 where, "[u]nder the
228. Id. at 724-25.
229. See id. at 725-28 (offering reasons for judicial caution in dealing with international
law and the common law).
230. Id. at 732.
231. See also id. at 732 n.20 (discussing whether private actors may also be sued for these
violations of international law). The Court concluded that private liability extended to crimes
for which a sufficient consensus on liability existed. Id.
232. Supra note 204 and accompanying text.
233. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,316 (1945) ("[D]ue process requires
only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment inpersonam, if he be not present within
the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that.., the suit does
not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."').
234. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 621 (1990) (plurality opinion)
("International Shoe confined its 'minimum contacts' requirement to situations in which the
defendant 'be not present within the territory of the forum,' and nothing... expands that
requirement beyond that."); see also Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 447 (E.D. Ark
1959) (finding passengers on a plane flying over the court's jurisdiction to be present within the
territorial limits of that jurisdiction and thus amenable to service under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure).
235. See Kadic v. Karadfid, 70 F.3d 232,247 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming personal service of
process over an ATS defendant within the territory of the United States).
236. HARoLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 148
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Brussels Convention, transient jurisdiction over another EU domiciliary based
solely on territorial service of process would be deemed 'exorbitant"' and thus
disallowed.237 Because transient jurisdiction is permissible, the United States
may ironically have broader civil jurisdiction than either Spain or Belgium.
238
But what if the defendant is not physically present within the land,
airspace, or territorial waters of the United States? Personal jurisdiction might
still be possible. American citizens are always subject to the personal
jurisdiction of the United States, even if they are not within the country.239 If a
defendant has assets in the United States-ill-gotten gains originally procured
by violating international law24---an American court would almost certainly
have jurisdiction for proceedings against that property.241 The ATS could thus
be used to imperil the finances of international criminals even when they are
not within American borders. For the hostis humanis generis, the United States
would be neither a safe haven nor a lucrative place to invest.
If the defendant's assets in the United States are not (verifiably) derived
from his victims, jurisdiction could still be possible if the defendant has
"purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum state" and "the
assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with fair play and justice.
242
Even defendants who are outside the United States may be subject to personal
(2008).
237. Id. at 149. Article 3 of the Convention explicitly overrides the Danish and British
jurisdictional rules which permit transient jurisdiction. Id.
238. See id. at 148-49 (delineating the differences between American and European Union
law on transient jurisdiction).
239. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932) ("The jurisdiction of the
United States over its absent citizen, so far as the binding effect of its legislation is concerned, is
a jurisdiction in personam .. ").
240. Cf. CrimC (Jer) 40/61 Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann (Eichmann 1), 36 I.L.R.
18, 166-67 (1961) (recording the property plundered from Jewish victims in the Holocaust).
But see Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942, 948 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895) (implying that the
ATS would provide jurisdiction for the violation of an American treaty if the suit was for a tort
only and not for the return of property). If the property was not taken in association with
genocide, war crimes, or some other clearly defined violation of international law (like piracy or
perhaps brigandage), then federal courts would not have jurisdiction over the case under the
ATS; recourse could still be had to state courts of general jurisdiction (if the state long-arm
statute permitted) or federal courts if some other jurisdictional basis could be found.
241. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977) ("[W]hen claims to the property
itself are the source of the underlying controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant, it
would be unusual for the State where the property is located not to have jurisdiction.") (citations
omitted).
242. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (citations omitted). A
complex body of law has grown around exactly what "minimum contacts" and "fair play and
justice" mean. This Note only attempts to comprise the specific issue ofjurisdiction under the
ATS, without addressing these broader jurisdictional issues.
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jurisdiction when "the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws. ',243  When a defendant's minimum contacts with
individual states are insufficient to permit personal jurisdiction, then as a last
resort Rule 4(k)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applies:
For a claim that arises under federal law, serving a summons or filing a
waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant if:
(A) The defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state's courts of
general jurisdiction; and (B) exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the
United States Constitution and law.
2"
Rule 4(k)(2) essentially permits suits under the ATS against defendants who
have minimum contacts with the United States as a whole (but no minimum
contacts with any specific state).245 The national contacts test for civil
jurisdiction which the ATS enjoys is the broadest civil jurisdiction standard
possible in the United States, albeit one that only applies when personal
jurisdiction is lacking in every individual state. 246 The minimal due process
concerns of civil jurisdiction stand in stark contrast to unlimited universal
jurisdiction over criminal defendants; the disparity of having higher standards
of due process for defendants in civil suits than in criminal trials is further
analyzed in Part IV.A. 1.
IV. Discussion
This Note has discussed the actual practice of states with regard to
criminal and civil jurisdiction; the discussion now shifts to the defects that
result from unlimited universal jurisdiction. Part IV.A addresses theoretical
and empirical issues stemming from the exercise of universal jurisdiction when
there is a lack of connecting links. In Part IV.B, this Note proposes solutions
243. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,253 (1958) (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)); see also McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)
("[M]odern transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party
sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity.").
244. FED. R. Crv. P. 4(k)(2) (emphasis added). "Arising under international law" is broad
language which "includes all claims that 'arise' in one way or another under federal law."
LINDA MULLENIX ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL COURTS AND JURISDIcTIoN 279 (1998). A
claim under the ATS would thus arise under federal law. See id. at 280 (including admiralty and
maritime claims within this category, not just federal questions).
245. MULLENIX, supra note 244, at 279.
246. Koh, supra note 236, at 180.
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that would mitigate these difficulties of unlimited jurisdiction while providing
an equivalent remedy to the problem of accountability.
A. The Problems of Unlimited Universal Jurisdiction
Universal jurisdiction has many critics. This Note focuses its analysis on
the specific flaws of unlimited universal jurisdiction, flaws that a requirement
of some connecting link would remedy. Part IV.A. 1 raises arguments as to the
legitimacy of exercising unlimited jurisdiction against individual defendants,
while Part IV.A.2 addresses state concerns of sovereignty and comity. Finally,
Part IV.A.3 compares the success of universal jurisdiction prosecutions based
on connecting links to those without any. As these arguments demonstrate,
unlimited universal jurisdiction has more problems and fewer benefits than
universal jurisdiction with connecting links.
1. Legitimacy
A primary argument against unlimited jurisdiction is that the defendant
has not authorized the prosecuting state to exercise its judicial power over him
in any way. In theory, governments derive their authority from the consent of
the governed.247 Actual or implied consent by the individual is required in
order to justify the exercise of power by the state.248 With unlimited
jurisdiction, that consent is lacking; the Guatemalan defendants most certainly
did not consent to being prosecuted for genocide by Spain. When some
connection exists, consent can be implied from that link: set foot on Spanish
soil and be subjected to Spanish law; victimize Spanish nationals and be
subjected to Spanish law. But when Spain takes upon itself the role of the
world's policeman and asserts the power to vindicate any victim anywhere, the
authority to do so is not derived from the consent of the governed. 249 A
247. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these truths to
be self-evident.... [t]hat to secure these [inalienable] rights, Governments are instituted among
Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed .... ").
248. See John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil
Government, in Two TREATISES OF GOvERNMENT 267,330 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1988) (1689) ("Men being, as has been said, by Nature, all free, equal and independent,
no one can be put out of this Estate, and subjected to the Political Power of another, without his
own Consent."); see also id. at 330-33, 350-53 (articulating the social contract theory of
government).
249. See Glenn Greenwald, Germany's Claim to "Universal" Power over Other Countries'
Citizens, UNCLAIMED TERRrroRY, Nov. 15,2006, http://glenngreenwald.blogspot.com/2006/l 1/
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democratic deficit exists between the law that the defendant has consented to
live under and the law under which he is judged. Unlimited jurisdiction flies in
the face of the social contract theory of government, and any academic
suggestions that international law affirmatively supports a norm of unlimited
jurisdiction, and thus supersedes democracy and the social contract, are merely
wishful thinking.250
If the state derives authority for unlimited jurisdiction from the
condemnation of the crimes committed, then the basis of the authority comes,
not from democracy, but from the moral authority of the international order-as
interpreted unilaterally by the judiciary of one state.251 But arguments that the
horrendous nature of the crime or ending a culture of impunity justify universal
jurisdiction are, at their core, assertions that the ends justify the means-with
no other logical basis for support. 2  Granted, the ends (prosecuting heinous
war criminals) are compelling and the means (violating Guatemala's
sovereignty or disregarding the rights of the accused) may be less compelling,
but major moral and philosophical lines of thought oppose such a formula.253
When a state derives its prosecutorial authority from the more mundane, more
customary basis of ordinary self-interest accompanying a nexus to the
germanys-claim-to-universal-power-over.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) ("[O]ne country...
arrogat[ing] unto themselves the right of 'universal jurisdiction'-basically the power of a
world government-seems rather dangerous and un-democratic in the extreme. 'Consent of the
governed' is the linchpin of the legitimate exercise of government power, and it is utterly
lacking with... universal jurisdiction.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
250. See supra Part II.B (analyzing international law and concluding that unlimited
jurisdiction finds no support there).
251. Cf Bassiouni, supra note 28, at 43 (discussing universal jurisdiction's early roots in
monotheistic theology). Universal jurisdiction derived from the moral authority ofjus cogens is
not too dissimilar from, say, the universal moral authority claimed by the Ayatollah Khomeini to
issue afatwa sentencing Salman Rushdie to death for heresy (though obviously the crimes each
moral authority purports to have authority over vary widely). Id. at 276 n.20.
252. Greenwald, supra note 249. Greenwald states:
It doesn't matter how bad of a person one thinks [the defendant] is or how criminal
one thinks his conduct is. None of that justifies having him prosecuted by a foreign
government in which he has no democratic representation and no input and which
has no unique connection to his alleged crimes ....
Id.
253. Compare Plato, Crito, in THE LAST DAYS OF SOCRATES 79, 88 (Hugh Tredennick and
Harold Tarrant trans., Penguin rev. ed. 2003) (n.d.) ("SOCRATES: So one ought not to return
an injustice or an injury to any person, no matter what the provocation.... [B]etween those
who think so and those who do not there can be no shared deliberation ... ." (emphasis added),
with KISSINGER, supra note 14, at 279 ("[A] universal standard ofjustice should not be based on
the proposition that a just end justifies unjust means, or that political fashion trumps fair judicial
procedures.").
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prosecuting state, then consent is fulfilled and no appeal needs to be made to
the ubiquitous moral authority ofjus cogens.
Unlimited jurisdiction also proves troublesome because it undermines a
fundamental cornerstone of international criminal law-the presumption of
innocence until proven guilty.254 If jurisdiction depends solely upon the
severity of the crime, in order for a court to hear the case it must make a
preliminary finding that the defendant grossly violated international law.255
Courts regularly make, without prejudice, similar findings on matters of
indictment, admissibility of evidence, etc. But no legal issue is so fundamental
as jurisdiction, and no finding is so prejudicial as jurisdiction based upon the
defendant's commission of heinous atrocities. When jurisdiction is derived
solely from the heinousness of the defendant's crimes, judges gain the power to
hear the case by making preliminary determinations that the defendant
committed more serious crimes: genocide rather than murder, crimes against
humanity rather than rape. Judges should limit the extent to which they enlarge
256their own power, 6 and any sua sponte enlargement of the scope of judicial
power justified by a righteous cause bodes ill for both the defendants before the
court and society as a whole.257 Universal jurisdiction with connecting links
mitigates this conflict to some degree by requiring a basis for jurisdiction
greater than just the gravity of the crime.
This particularjudicial conflict of interest can be seen as part of a broader
problem with due process, a problem which further deprives unlimited
jurisdiction of legitimacy. Some nexus with the prosecuting state is generally
seen by courts as a requirement in order to uphold the due process rights of the
defendant:
As has long been settled, and as we reaffirm today, a state court may
exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only so long as
there exist "minimum contacts" between the defendant and the forum State.
The concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to perform two
related, but distinguishable functions. It protects the defendant against the
254. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 66, adopted July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (guaranteeing a presumption of innocence until proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt for defendants).
255. See, e.g., PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION Principle 1(3) (2001)
("A state may rely on universal jurisdiction as a basis for seeking... extradition... provided
that it has established a prima facie case of the person's guilt .. ").
256. See Debra Lyn Bassett, Statutory Interpretation in the Context of Federal
Jurisdiction, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 52, 53 (2007) (noting the separation-of-powers and
conflict-of-interest concerns that arise when courts determine the scope of their own powers).
257. See KISSINGER, supra note 14, at 273 ("[H]istorically, the dictatorship of the virtuous
has often led to inquisitions. .... ").
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burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to
ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the
limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns .... 258
As many first-year law students can attest, civil jurisdiction over civil
defendants is complicated enough because of due process concerns; criminal
law, with its stronger emphasis on the rights of defendants, should require at
least the same (and probably a greater) standard of due process so that "the
defendant's conduct and connections with the forum State" are enough to
justify "being haled into court there., 259 Surely the inconvenience of defending
oneself in a distant, unfamiliar forum is far more prejudicial to-and due
process should accordingly be greater for-a criminal defendant than a civil
defendant.
Unfortunately, universal jurisdiction's lack of selectivity in its application
cheapens the use of universal jurisdiction. When Belgium indicts Colin Powell
alongside Saddam Hussein and Ariel Sharon alongside Yasser Arafat, 260 a
problem exists. Part of the problem was undoubtedly due to the peculiar
Belgian institution through which complaints could be brought,26' but even
without this added wrinkle, the issue ofprosecutorial discretion remains. How
is a state to decide which international criminal to prosecute first under
unlimited universal jurisdiction? With no connection to the prosecuting state,
an equal interest exists in bringing all of them to justice, beginning with the
most heinous. Realistically, it seems more likely that prosecutors and
investigating judges will pursue the cases which will best advance their careers.
Why prosecute petty crooks when you can go after gdnocidaires?
262
The fact remains that, without some connecting link, the prosecutor has no
stake in the local conditions where the crime was committed, and the
community where the crime was committed has no say in the outcome of the
258. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,291-92 (1980) (citations
omitted). While World-Wide Volkswagen dealt with civil, not criminal, jurisdiction, some
courts have extended its logic to the due process rights of criminal defendants. See, e.g., United
States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1257 (9th Cir. 1998) ("The nexus requirement
serves the same purpose as the 'minimum contacts' test in personal jurisdiction. It ensures that
a United States court will assert jurisdiction only over a defendant who 'should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court' in this country." (citing World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at
297)).
259. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
260. Supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (describing how foreign victims may bring
suits in Belgium).
262. Cf. William A. Schabas, National Courts Finally Begin to Prosecute Genocide, the
"Crime of Crimes," 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 39, 39 (2003) (labeling genocide "the crime of
crimes").
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trial. 263 "The local community must confront the crime that has occurred
among its people and seek a nuanced resolution that they can live with. When
the local community tries the case, other countries can recognize the legitimacy
of their interest and are likely to honour their decision .... ,,24 But because a
state exercising unlimited jurisdiction has no connection to the defendant or the
local conditions, the truths that it produces are less likely to be complete.265 At
best universal jurisdiction trials will be good faith efforts to replicate a local
tribunal; at worst they will be self-serving show trials. Most will fall in
between, unconsciously internalizing the perspectives and prejudices of the
prosecuting state. This unilateral approach to atrocities occurring in other
countries can hardly be expected to produce consistent results in sync with the
views of the victimized country and the international community.266 When a
single national court takes it upon itself to enforce international law, why
should the result be legitimate in the eyes of the world?
2. Sovereignty and Comity
If "[j]urisdiction is a manifestation of a State's sovereignty, '267 then the
exercise of unlimited jurisdiction is the manifestation of one state's sovereignty
within the borders of another state. When, in the absence of connecting links,
Spanish judges assert jurisdiction over a Guatemalan or Chinese defendant,
Spain is inserting its sovereign authority into the (equally sovereign) territory of
Guatemala or China. International law is somewhat against this; after all, the
UN Charter states: "The [United Nations] Organization is based on the
principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members., 268  Insofar as
sovereignty is a principle of international law, any statement to the effect that
"there is no basis for finding that [unlimited] universal jurisdiction... is
263. See George P. Fletcher, Against Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 580,
583 (2003) (discussing the interests of the community where the crime was committed).
264. Id.
265. See, e.g., MARK DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 84
(2007) (criticizing Belgian courts trying cases of Rwandan genocide for producing
"monodimensional and partial narratives" which "permit the former colonial state to cleanse its
[past] wrongdoing and appear heroic in its quest for justice").
266. See, e.g., supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing Rose Kabuye's extradition
to France for trial based upon an unorthodox view of the Rwandan genocide).
267. Sentencia Tribunal Supreme [STS], Feb. 25,2003, translated in 42 I.L.M. 686,697
(2003).
268. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
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contrary to other principles of international law" is false,269 and a justification
of the doctrine based upon the dicta of the Lotus case-that whatever is not
prohibited by international law is permitted-fails. 27  This commitment to
sovereign equality is unqualified-it exists for all states, even the ones
harboring war criminals. It would clearly violate sovereignty for Spain to
attempt to extradite and prosecute China's common criminals; are former heads
of state any different?
271
But perhaps this dilemma can be avoided through the following
formulation: A state which exercises unlimited universal jurisdiction to punish
violations of international law does so as an agent of the international
community, not as a mere state. The question then becomes the following:
How does a state become an agent of the international community? So far,
states like Belgium and Spain have tried to exercise unlimited universal
jurisdiction, not at the request of the international community or even another
state, but sua sponte. If only human-rights respecting, rule-of-law upholding,
"good" states (i.e., Western nations) possess the ability to deputize themselves
on behalf of the international community, while "bad" states cannot, this
rationale too falls afoul of sovereign equality. If all states were empowered to
use unlimited universal jurisdiction, the result would be a "judicial chaos.
2 72
The results were ridiculous but harmless when the independent Belgian
judiciary neutrally indicted world leaders, but imagine what would happen if
courts in other countries, under pressure from the ruling regime, began
proceedings against its political enemies.273
This persistent argument against universal jurisdiction-that it cuts both
ways, that any state can use it as a tool both for and against justice-is an
accurate assessment. This inherent flaw in every scheme of universal
jurisdiction which permits prosecution without connecting links, without some
269. STS, 42 I.L.M. at 710 (dissent).
270. Supra note 92.
271. Cf. BECCARIA, supra note 1, at 84 ("Some have pretended, that in whatever country a
crime... be committed, the criminal may be justly punished for it in any other: as if.. . a man
could live in one country and be subject to the laws of another, or be accountable for his actions
to two sovereigns, or two codes of laws, often contradictory.").
272. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3,44 (Feb.
14) (separate opinion of President Guillaume). President Guillaume continues: "Contrary to
what is advocated by certain publicists, such a development would represent not an advance in
the law but a step backward." Id.
273. See The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION,
supra note 28, at 18, 19 ("Improper exercises of criminal jurisdiction, including universal
jurisdiction, may be used merely to harass political opponents, or for aims extraneous to
criminal justice.").
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specific stake in the outcome, cannot be fixed. It is an innate aspect of
unilateral prosecutions by national courts. Recognizing a need for connecting
links in order to obtain legitimacy could successfully create a heuristic
distinguishing between acceptable practice and abuse, but restricting the
practice of unlimited jurisdiction will be impossible if it becomes an accepted
international norm. Any restrictive international regime that attempts to limit
the countries exercising universal jurisdiction only to those states that use it
responsibly will be decried as imperialist or Eurocentric by the third-world
nations and human rights offenders that it excludes. Truly universal
jurisdiction is too dangerous a tool for all states to possess; because it cannot be
restricted to just the states that would use it wisely, it must be denied to all.
Major concerns of peace versus justice also arise when one state exercises
universal jurisdiction without any connecting links over the pardoned war
criminals of another state.27 4 Peaceful transitions from dictatorship to
democracy are often conditioned on amnesty and pardons for the former
275tyrants.  Unlimited jurisdiction could make peace negotiations more difficult,
potentially increasing transaction costs by giving disinterested third-parties a
veto over an agreement by the wronged party not to prosecute to a degree that
universal jurisdiction with connecting links will not.276 A fundamental tenet of
international law is that an agreement between two states cannot "create either
obligations or rights for a third State without its consent." 277 Thus, two parties
to a peace settlement cannot extinguish the rights of a third state to prosecute
defendants for crimes committed against it. A requirement of connecting links
decreases the group of potential prosecutors from every state to just those states
which possess some connection to potential defendants, enabling the parties to
better identify any future threats to peace and resolve them in the peace
negotiations.
Indictments and resulting requests for extradition also raise serious
concerns about unlimited jurisdiction. Simply put, requests for extradition
alarm and provoke defendants. When Spain indicted the four defendants in the
Guatemala case, the former police chief and former Defense Minister were
274. See generally Leila Nadya Sadat, Universal Jurisdiction, National Amnesties, and
Truth Commissions: Reconciling the Irreconcilable, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note
28, at 193, 196-212 (discussing the conflict between universal jurisdiction and amnesty in terms
of the peace vs. justice debate).
275. Id.
276. See Eugene Kontorovich, The Inefficiency of Universal Jurisdiction, 2008 U. ILL. L.
REv. 389, 391 (treating universal jurisdiction as a broad standing rule and analyzing it from an
economic standpoint).
277. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 34, done May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 8 I.L.M. 679.
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arrested by Guatemalan authorities and the former head of the Secret Police
fled and is now missing, while the ex-president holed up in his house. 278 Who
knows how future defendants will react? Perhaps by deciding that they have
nothing left to lose. The academics and activists who applaud the potency of
universal jurisdiction fail to realize that Spain's actions have had uncontrollable
consequences in Guatemala, consequences that could have been much more
severe.
In addition to disrupting another state's chosen reconciliation process,
universal jurisdiction can also threaten that society's peaceful existence. As
Professor Roht-Arriaza notes:
The powerful military and civilian figures who order such crimes usually
retain a large amount ofpower--dejure or defacto-even after the conflict
ends or the government changes and are singularly uninterested in criminal
investigations into the past. In contrast, the post-armed conflict state tends
to be weak, with limited resources and a culture of corruption and self-
dealing among state authorities.
27 9
Universal jurisdiction injects instability into this fragile post-conflict balance of
power. Foreign indictments and extradition requests for war criminals with
strong bases of power could result in more than mere flight: Leaders pardoned
by their own country but prosecuted by a foreign nation could rally their
supporters to resist arrest or even return to the fight. In the (unlikely) worst
case scenario, defendants reacting to the exercise of universal jurisdiction could
restart a civil war. At best, an extradition request could cause a defendant,
supposedly innocent until proven guilty, to be held by the requested state for an
indefinite period of time until the highest echelon of the judiciary determines
the country's position on universal jurisdiction.28 ° Somewhere in between is
the prospect that a defendant facing extradition might simply choose to
disappear. Maybe (would foreign prosecutors consider this?) a state prefers to
have an unindicted war criminal at a known location rather than an indicted war
criminal at an unknown location. A foreign power's exercise of universal
jurisdiction, even through a simple extradition request, makes it harder for a
278. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 15, at 80. But see Roht-Arriaza, supra note 128, at 316 ("At
least one defendant in [Spain's prosecutions], Jorge Acosta, reportedly came out of hiding and
turned himself in to an Argentine court after Judge Garz6n in Spain asked Interpol to track him
down.").
279. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 15, at 80-81.
280. See, e.g., id. at 80 ("After over a year in detention, the defendants were freed when
Guatemala's Constitutional Court ('GCC') decided on December 12, 2007 that it would not
honor Spanish arrest warrants or extradition requests.").
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state to postpone investigation of atrocities until it feels that the time is right
and its own society is ready.When the disregard of international comity through the exercise of
universal jurisdiction may result in bloodshed, preserving comity becomes a
much more compelling concern. What guaranty is there that states will refrain
from prosecuting war criminals when doing so would disrupt the internal peace
processes of another state? Prosecutorial discretion, as discussed previously,28'
is woefully inadequate; unlimited universal jurisdiction has already been used
to indict such heinous criminals as Rose Kabuye, Colin Powell, and George H.
W. Bush.282 Future prosecutors and judges likely will be less sensitive to the
effects their actions have upon distant communities than to the desires of their
own constituencies, and a post-conflict state's choice between reconciliation
and justice can be negated and superseded by the exercise of unlimited
jurisdiction half a world away.
3. Impotence
The most damning critique of unlimited universal jurisdiction is this: No
successes exist under universal jurisdiction when there are no connecting
links. 3 Unlimited jurisdiction, as a system, simply is not working. Its flaws
would be more tolerable if it managed to secure convictions (after all, the
professed goal of universal jurisdiction is to put an end to impunity), but,
despite hundreds of indictments, 284 unlimited jurisdiction has never even
resulted in a trial.285
The proponents of universal jurisdiction often point out the positive effects
that the doctrine achieves. The "Pinochet effect," for example, has been used to
describe the immense transformation, away from impunity and towards a
greater focus on human rights, which was catalyzed by the arrest of General
Pinochet in Britain.286 Other benefits of transnational prosecutions are also
281. Supra notes 260-62 and accompanying text.
282. Supra notes 4, 116 and accompanying text.
283. Supra notes 115, 139 and accompanying text; see also Parts II.C. 1-2 (chronicling the
rise and fall of unlimited jurisdiction in Belgium and Spain, respectively).
284. Supra note 133 and accompanying text.
285. See REYDAMS, supra note 37, at 118 ("This situation fuels the criticism that the
proceedings in absentia against the world's villains are window-dressing.").
286. See generally NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA, THE PINOCHEr EFFECT: TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE
IN THE AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2005) (describing the Spanish legal efforts against Argentine and
Chilean defendants, including Pinochet, and examining their implications for transnational
justice and human rights).
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stressed: the expertise gained by local lawyers dealing with complex
international law,287 the strengthening of domestic court systems,288 the
catalysis of domestic prosecutions, 289 and greater political awareness. 290 As
Professor Roht-Arriaza, a prominent advocate of human rights, argues:. "The
success of [transnational prosecutions], like that of international prosecutions
more generally, should be measured not only (or even principally) by how
many convictions they secure, but at how well they succeed in changing the
possibilities for justice at home.
291
But it is questionable whether these (admittedly valuable) aspirational
benefits should be the goal ofjudges. These benefits are, after all, nonlegal; it
is one thing for victims' advocates to file a quixotic lawsuit in order to obtain
greater political awareness, and another for a judge to entertain it for that
reason. After a certain point, the quest for justice becomes political.2 92 The
response of Judge G6mez to the Guatemalan Constitutional Court's ruling2 93 is
not typical judicial behavior; it delves into the realm of foreign policy, which
might be best left to elected officials. One of the common threads in the
Belgian and Spanish prosecutions is the accessibility of the judicial process to
victims, and thus to grass-roots efforts to effect change. 294 If other national and
international institutions were as open to the needs of victims, resort to the
judiciary would not be necessary in order to achieve aspirational benefits.
B. Solutions
This Note would be remiss to point out the failings implicit in universal
jurisdiction without endeavoring to offer some modest proposal to ameliorate
them. Part IV.B.l attempts to expound a limited version of universal
jurisdiction, exercised only where connecting links exist, as a superior option to
unlimited universal jurisdiction. Part IV.B.2 recommends expansive civil
jurisdiction as an auxiliary to consider when a lack of connecting links would
287. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 15, at 88-90.
288. Id. at 90-94.
289. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 128, at 315.
290. Id. at 315-16.
291. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 15, at 106.
292. See KiSSINGER, supra note 14, at 277-79 (criticizing universaljurisdiction's intrusion
into the realm of politics).
293. Supra notes 162--64 and accompanying text.
294. Supra Parts II.C.1-2.
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preclude criminal prosecution via universal jurisdiction. Finally, Part IV.B.3
explores other jurisdictional options for perpetrators of international crimes.
1. Universal Criminal Jurisdiction with Connecting Links
All of the problems described in Part IV.A are mitigated by a requirement
of some nexus between the accused and the prosecuting state. When there are
connecting links, the state should be allowed to try the defendant under the
doctrine of universal jurisdiction. In the absence of any connection to the
defendant, the state should not try the case or even attempt to extradite the
defendant for trial. The main practical distinction between unlimited universal
jurisdiction and universal jurisdiction with connecting links is the scope of
judicial power: Unlimited jurisdiction enables judges to act as "knights errant"
questing out and smiting the "enemies of all mankind" wherever in the world
they may be,295 whereas universal jurisdiction with connecting links typically
"1goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy., 296 The requirement of
some nexus focuses judicial efforts within the territory of the prosecuting state,
ensuring that the country is no safe haven for human rights violations and only
permitting judicial sorties abroad when justified by some connection to the
prosecuting state.
What qualifies as a connecting link? No narrow definition should be
applied to the term; a court should be free to tailor the concept to the specific
fact pattern of the case before it-within reasonable bounds. But the
precedents, plausibility, and logical coherence of the court's legal justifications
will go a long way toward proving that the court is legitimately acting in good
faith. The presence of the defendant in the prosecuting state's territory is the
most obvious of all connecting links and has been used by academics to
categorize theoretically weaker forms of universal jurisdiction.297
Other connections could also qualify as the prerequisite nexus, such as the
consent of the defendant, the consent of the defendant's state of nationality,298 a
pre-existing commitment by the prosecuting state to defend the victims,299 or
295. Supra note 1 and accompanying text.
296. Representative John Quincy Adams, Address to the House of Representatives (July 4,
1821), in THE OxFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONs 3 (Elizabeth Knowles ed., 6th ed. 2004).
297. See INAZUMI, supra note 20, at 54 (describing universal jurisdiction in classical
international law as a "supplemental (secondary) jurisdiction which was exercised only after
other jurisdictions had failed.., and after efforts to extradite had been exhausted").
298. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (discussing consent by flag states for
American prosecution of drug traffickers).
299. See The Zyklon B Case, 1 L.R.T.W.C. 93, 103 (Brit. Mil. Ct. 1946), available at
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other, more amorphous links. 300 Exact delineation of what constitutes a
connecting link is impossible, though the rough standard should be that the
connecting link amounts to actual or implied consent to jurisdiction. Courts,
while recognizing the requirement, should feel free to apply it flexibly yet
impartially to the facts before them.
All of these suggestions could plausibly be used to support the proposition
that the defendant consented in some way to the state's exercise ofjurisdiction.
What should not qualify as connecting links for the purposes of universal
jurisdiction are mere superficialities: Cultural, historical, social, linguistic, and
legal connections between two countries should not suffice for the exercise of
jurisdiction.0 1 Such broad characteristics would lead to a form of judicial
imperialism by European states over former colonies. A common language
cannot reasonably be used to argue that the defendant consented to jurisdiction
or that the sovereignty of another state remains unmolested; it lends itself more
as one of many factors to figure into a forum non conveniens analysis if
multiple states compete for jurisdiction.
2. Expansive Civil Jurisdiction
In addition to universal criminal jurisdiction with connecting links,
extensive civil jurisdiction should also be available to provide an additional
method of reducing impunity. While victims should always have the option of
http://www.loc.govrr/frd/Military_Law-reports-trials-war-criminals.html (basing jurisdiction on
the grounds that, inter alia, "the United Kingdom has a direct interest in punishing the
perpetrators of crimes if the victim was a national of an ally engaged in a common struggle
against a common enemy"); see also The Belsen Trial, 2 L.R.T.W.C. 1, 128 (Brit. Mil. Ct.
1945), available at http://www.loc.govrr/frd/Military_Law-reports-trials-war-criminals.html
(mentioning the trial, conviction, and execution of a Japanese defendant by a British tribunal for
war crimes committed on French territory against American nationals); Cowles, supra note 48,
at 177-78, 217 (arguing for Allied universal jurisdiction over Nazi war crimes in World War II).
UN peacekeeping in Rwanda during the genocide, and the concomitant deaths of Belgian
peacekeepers because of their nationality, would be a good argument for a nexus between
Belgium and Rwandan g~mocidaires. REYDAMS, supra note 37, at 109. The attack on the
Spanish embassy by the Guatemalan military, which was provoked by the nonviolent seizure of
the embassy by demonstrators, could also be argued to create a nexus between Spain and the
defendants involved in the embassy incident, though this nexus should not be extended to cover
the entire genocide in Guatemala.
300. See, e.g., CrimC (Jer) 40/61 Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann (Eichmann 1), 36
I.L.R. 18, 52-54 (1961) (discussing the connections between the defendant, his crimes, the
Jewish people, and the state of Israel).
301. But cf Sentencia Tribunal Supremo [STS], Feb. 25, 2003 translated in 42 I.L.M. 686,
711 (2003) (dissent) (arguing that these types of connections between Spain and Guatemala
should meet the requirement of connecting links).
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seeking civil redress from their tormentors, civil liability becomes especially
attractive when criminal prosecution is impossible or unlikely. The only
connection between the defendant and the forum state would be the minimum
contacts, including proper service of process, required for due process.
Courts should be willing to stretch due process to the extreme, especially if
doing so is necessary to ensure that a forum exists in which plaintiffs can be
heard, and minimum contacts should be satisfied by the presence of the
defendant's assets as an alternative to the presence of the defendant. Judges
should remove all unnecessary obstacles to having the case heard on its
merits.
A hierarchy of contact between defendants and states is thus created: At
one end of the spectrum lie the elements for the traditional bases of
jurisdiction (such as nationality), then come the connecting links for limited
universal jurisdiction, and then the minimum contacts which due process
mandates in a civil suit. At the other end is the complete dearth of
connection between the defendant and the prosecuting state under unlimited
universal jurisdiction. The system this Note proposes rationally gives greater
due process rights to criminal, rather than civil, defendants.
Civil jurisdiction intrudes upon state sovereignty much less than the
exercise of universal jurisdiction. 0 2 While foreign litigation could override a
post-conflict country's chosen method of reparations and restitution, surely
that is less intrusive than universal jurisdiction overriding choices of amnesty
and reconciliation. The foreign state merely provides a neutral forum in
which plaintiffs may adjudicate their claims, thus avoiding the adversarial
role required in criminal prosecutions.303 The forum court may even apply
relevant foreign and international law, so that the rights of the parties remain
unchanged regardless of the venue where the claim is adjudicated.3 4 In
theory, a U.S. court hearing a case under the ATS is simply duplicating an
existing forum which the plaintiff, for various reasons, has chosen to forego.
Civil suits preserve the law and order of other states, threatening a
defendant's finances, not his freedom. Criminals will conceivably resist
arrest and extradition by any means necessary; after all, what do they have to
lose? Service of process, on the other hand, is unlikely to provoke such an
extreme response. A civil judgment may embarrass, entangle, or impoverish
302. REYDAMS, supra note 37, at 2-3; see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860,
862 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) ("Where the principle of international law is as clear and universal as the
Court of Appeals has found it to be, there is no reason to suppose that this court's assumption of
jurisdiction would give justifiable offense to Paraguay.").
303. REYDAMs, supra note 37, at 3 n.14.
304. Id.
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defendants, but it will not incarcerate them-and so seems unlikely to
endanger the safety of their neighbors. While the use of civil liability against
corporations involved in a developing country's economic growth could
cause a chilling effect on international investment in countries with poor
human rights records, existing legal and evidentiary standards seem sufficient
to protect international businesses from unwarranted harassment.
30 5
Civil cases also have to meet lower standards of due process than
criminal prosecutions, improving the chances of finding the defendant
culpable. 306 The civil standard of a preponderance of evidence is lower than
criminal law's requirement of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.30 7
And punitive damages, which are "designed to obtain objectives fostered
chiefly by criminal law, are nevertheless made without at least some of the
safeguards afforded by that law, such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt and
presumption of innocence."
308
Other procedural hurdles are also lower in civil trials. Acquiring
personal jurisdiction over the defendant in order to commence the trial in the
first place is far simpler for civil suits than criminal prosecutions.3 9
Extradition is unnecessary, and the delays and hazards 310 it entails are thus
avoided. The defendant's presence at trial is unnecessary, and default
305. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d
633,639 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (granting the corporate defendant's motion to dismiss based upon the
plaintiffs' inability to produce sufficient evidence showing that Talisman Energy violated
international law, or aided and abetted violations of international law, while investing in Sudan).
For a comprehensive discussion of accomplice liability under the ATS, see generally Chim~ne
I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 61 (2008).
306. See Sarkin, supra note 201, at 173 (comparing criminal and civil trials and noting that
"the civil standard is the lesser in a civil case").
307. Cf Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 66, adopted July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (guaranteeing a presumption of innocence until proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt for defendants).
308. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 866 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
309. Compare Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 447 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (acquiring
valid personal jurisdiction over a passenger flying above the state of Arkansas when service of
process occurred in mid-air), with Israel General 'Avoids UKArrest,' BBC NEWS, Sept. 12,
2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/4237620.stm (last visited Sept. 29,2009) (reporting
how Israeli General Doron Almog evaded a British arrest warrant based on universal
jurisdiction by simply not leaving his plane when it landed in London) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Attempting to arrest war criminals in the lobby of
Manhattan's Hotel Intercontinental or London's Heathrow Airport endangers lives in a way that
serving process does not. See BoTrIGLIERO, supra note 216, at 54 n.34, 62 n.56 (describing
service of process on defendants of claims under the ATS while they are in New York City for
meetings at the United Nations).
310. Supra notes 278-80 and accompanying text.
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judgments are common under the ATS. 31 1 Procedural difficulties may arise
in enforcing the judgment,312 but it is better to experience these problems after
a judgment has been entered than before the defendant is even in the custody of
the court.
Best of all, civil suits actually get results. It is far easier to win a lawsuit
under the ATS than to place a defendant on trial using universal jurisdiction.313
As emphasized above, universal criminal jurisdiction makes the news not
because of any success in prosecuting heinous criminals, but because of how
outrageous and pointless the prosecutions can be. If Spain continues to indict
Chinese officials committing genocide in Tibet,314 the motivation for doing so
is probably not any realistic hope of extradition and conviction. Most
prosecutions based on universal jurisdiction without connecting links fail after
extradition is refused (and it usually is).31 5 Instead, the purpose of these
prosecutions is aspirational, highlighting to the world the plight of the Tibetan
people. The aspirational and ideological value of failed criminal indictments
are often emphasized: "[A]t a minimum, they would serve as a valuable
historical record and a validation of witness testimony. The indictments would
also serve as a powerful tool.., to pursue new avenues of investigation and
prosecution. 31 6 But successful civil suits can fulfill the same investigatory,
condemnatory roles, without the negative side effects of unlimited universal
jurisdiction.
Indeed, civil jurisdiction has a proven record of producing judgments
against actual violators of international law.317 The plaintiffs in Filartiga were
311. See, e.g., Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza, No. 94 Civ. 3627 (JSM), 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4409, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (granting the plaintiffs in an ATS case default judgment);
Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 202 (D. Mass. 1995) (same)..
312. See BOTrIGLIERO, supra note 216, at 66 ("Unfortunately, at present the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments abroad remain at the same time one of the more
important elements and perhaps the weakest point in the domestic implementation of redress.").
313. See, e.g., supra note 309 (highlighting one of many lower procedural hurdles under
civil liability).
314. Supra note 165 and accompanying text.
315. See Cynthia van Maanen, What Does Universal Jurisdiction Mean for the Future of
the Sovereign State?, QUANTITATIVE PEACE, Aug. 28, 2008, http://www.global
policy.org/intljustice/universal/2008/0828sovereign.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) ("While
courts can assert their right to prosecute any crime against humanity, whether it takes place
within their territory or not, one must question the value of such legal motions without
international enforcement.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
316. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 15, at 101.
317. Compare the default judgment that the plaintiffs obtained against the former
Guatemalan Minister of Defense in Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162,202 (D. Mass. 1995),
with the protracted and ultimately fruitless Spanish indictment of the Guatemalan defendants,
supra Part II.D.2.
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awarded $10,385,364 in damages on remand.3t8 Dozens of plaintiffs winning
their suits under the ATS have been awarded thousands of dollars in
compensatory damages and millions in punitive damages.319 Granted, these
astronomical awards of punitive damages are typically never going to be paid in
full to the plaintiffs. For example, the plaintiffs have only collected four
hundred dollars from General Suarez-Mason. 320 But while the plaintiffs in the
Marcos class action have yet to receive any compensation, the judgment did
deprive the estate of $450 million in assets hidden in Switzerland.321
Regardless of their final enforceability, these judgments "have vindicated the
individual plaintiffs, allowing them to confront their tormentors and have the
truth told.
3 22
The aspirational value of a civil judgment against a war criminal should be
as great, if not greater, than a criminal indictment and unfulfilled request for
extradition. A civil judgment, even a default judgment against an absent
defendant, provides some measure of vindication to the plaintiff. Though "it is
difficult to conceive of any civil remedy which can begin to compensate the
plaintiffs for their loss or adequately express society's outrage at the
defendant's actions, 3 23 awarding several million dollars of punitive damages
condemns the behavior of the defendant more than any mere indictment,
especially if that indictment is simply the latest ploy in a long line of politicized
maneuvers.
3. Other Considerations for Criminal Jurisdiction
When a defendant is already being prosecuted under universal jurisdiction
based on connecting links, adding additional charges against that defendant
318. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 867 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
319. See SHELTON, supra note 209, at 164-70 (listing ATS cases and the compensatory and
punitive damages awarded).
320. Id. at 172 n.316.
321. See supra note 216 (discussing the enforcement of the judgment against assets in
Swiss banks).
322. SHELTON, supra note 209, at 172.
323. Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza, 94 Civ. 3627 (JSM), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4409, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The court continued:
This Judge has seen no other case in which monetary damages were so inadequate
to compensate the plaintiffs for the injuries caused by a defendant. One can not
place a dollar value on the lives lost as the result of the defendant's actions and the
suffering inflicted on the innocent victims of his cruel campaign. Unfortunately,
however, a monetary judgment is all the Court can award these plaintiffs.
Id. at *6.
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which lack connecting links does not seriously undermine comity, sovereignty,
or legitimacy. 324  Early Spanish prosecutions did this, emphasizing Spanish
victims at first and adding non-Spanish victims after investigation began.325
Such a tactic adds legitimacy to exercises of universal jurisdiction, but it also
spares the defendant the inconvenience of multiple trials. Any requirement of
connecting links will eventually be fulfilled when the defendant is present in
that state's custody (and the additional charges added then), so an initial
indictment or extradition request should be free to include them. This
"supplemental" jurisdiction should be exercised only for charges against the
same defendant, not for the same charge against different defendants. Thus, a
nexus to one defendant who committed genocide, for example, would be
insufficient to establish a nexus to other co-offenders who by themselves had
no connection to the prosecuting state.
Another possible solution to the problems caused by national courts
exercising universal jurisdiction is an international court exercising universal
jurisdiction. Though some opponents of universal jurisdiction also oppose any
international tribunal, even they would prefer that to arbitrary, piecemeal
prosecutions by national courts.326 The specter of one world court bringing
international criminals to justice would have far more legitimacy than a single
Spanish or Belgian judge.327 Even multiple states acting collectively would
appear more legitimate than one country's courts acting unilaterally.
V Conclusion
The uninhibited exercise of unlimited universal jurisdiction has led to
innumerable indictments, sensational headlines, and minimal accountability.
The noble goals which unlimited jurisdiction attempted to achieve have not
been met, and ICJ Judge Francisco Rezek's adage proves true: "Any policy
adopted in the name of human rights but not in keeping with that discipline
324. Cf United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,725 (1966) (formulating a doctrine
of pendent jurisdiction over nonqualifying claims when accompanied by qualifying claims and
derived from a "common nucleus of operative fact").
325. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 128, at 314.
326. See, e.g., KISSINGER, supra note 14, at 279 ("To the extent that the ICC replaces the
claim of national judges to universal jurisdiction, it greatly improves the state of international
law.").
327. See Kontorovich, supra note 276, at 392 ("Even assuming the need for an
international prosecutorial power, that authority should be located in one or a few clearly
identified entities rather than in all states. The centralization of prosecutorial authority
would ... allow it to be put to its highest-value use.").
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threatens to harm rather than serve that cause. 328 Unlimited jurisdiction has
failed to succeed because states take umbrage at unfounded interference in their
affairs; beyond a certain point the exercise ofjurisdiction by the courts of one
state over the population of another crosses a line and violates international
329norms of sovereignty.
The nexus requirement for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction utilizes a
preexisting legal distinction to demarcate exactly where that line is, and
minimizing opposition to universal jurisdiction. Like all legal rules, inequity
can result when the rule is consistently applied, but the debate over universal
jurisdiction must transcend individual cases and attempt to produce the best
solution to competing interests of sovereignty and accountability, peace and
justice. Universal criminal jurisdiction with connecting links should permit
prosecution when the state has a legitimate interest in the case, while, through
the exercise of broad civil jurisdiction, victims who fail to find a connecting
link can still have a forum in which to seek financial redress and emotional
closure from their tormentors. This formulation represents the best way to
solve the potential problems of universal jurisdiction without sacrificing the
interests of justice.
Hopefully, universal jurisdiction is a temporary solution to the temporary
problem of impunity for international crimes. Commitment to the rule of law,
stronger judiciaries, and growing accountability should reduce the need for
third-parties to provide redress for violations of international law. Until that
day comes, however, until "an end to dependence on arbitrary power and
opinion, have provided security for oppressed innocence and hated virtue-
until universal reason.., has confined tyranny..., the persuasion that there is
not a foot of soil upon which real crimes are pardoned would be a most
efficacious way of preventing them. 
3 30
328. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3,94 (Feb.
14) (separate opinion of Judge Rezek).
329. Cf THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 15 (U.S. 1776) (complaining of
subjection "to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution and unacknowledged by our laws").
330. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRImEs AND PuisHMENTs 61 (Henry Paolucci trans., Bobbs-
Merrill 1963) (1764).
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